Brian M Downing
Relations between the US and Iran have been varying degrees of bad since the revolution and embassy seizure of 1979. The JCPOA of 2015 opened the door to better relations. The Obama administration and Rouhani government were amenable but the mullahs and generals, who oversee Rouhani, were not. The door slammed shut.
The mullahs and generals calculated that meaningful dialog would have angered Russia, Iran’s only major backer, and put the country in danger. They may have also calculated that the US would sooner or later elect another president who was hostile to Iran. That came sooner.
The Trump administration re-imposed sanctions, the IRGC struck shipping in the Gulf. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq hit US targets, the US killed an important IRGC general, Iranian missiles struck US facilities shortly thereafter. It goes on.
Basij militias and Khuzestan
Last week, an IRGC commander, Abdolhossein Mojaddami, was shot to death outside his dwelling in Khuzestan located in western Iran. The shooters fired from a motorcycle, then sped away. The target and location are interesting as they may have been selected to drive wedges between some Iranians and the state.
Mojaddami was not as important as Soleimani by any means but his killing is important because it took place inside Iran. He led a Basij militia unit which is ordinarily used not for national defense but for internal repression – most often against student demonstrators.
The militias are fiercely loyal to the regime and quite effective. They’ve beaten and killed thousands of young demonstrators in the decade after the fraudulent 2009 election. A Basij commander’s death will be welcomed by many young urbandwellers, though not publicly.
Khuzestan is home to vast oil resources and a large Arab population. The latter is more important than oil in this case. There is considerable Arab resentment of Persian rule which occasionally leads to terrorism, probably with foreign help. An Arab separatist leader was assassinated in the Netherlands two years ago, almost certainly by the IRGC.
Who did it?
No one has taken responsibility for killing Mojaddami. Two groups come to mind. The Arab Struggle Movement has set off bombs in Khuzestan. The MEK has used motorcyclists to kill scientists in the nuclear program. Both groups almost certainly have assistance from Mossad and money from Saudi Arabia. It’s unclear if these operations had American support over the years but they probably do now.
Assassinations inside Iran are likely to continue. Iranian security forces are undoubtedly stepping up surveillance and interrogations which may further anger young reformers. This may have been part of the assassins’ calculus.
The IRGC will retaliate for Mojaddami’s death, possibly by targeting a figure of equivalent standing – American or Saudi. The IRGC may also be helping Shia populations abroad perform assassinations and bombings. Iran might be unwilling to strike an Israeli target for fear of disproportionate IDF retaliation on Iranian and Hisbollah assets in Syria. There are many attractive sites and air defenses are weak.
Terrorism inside Iran?
Conditions in Iran are conducive to the rise of terrorism. There is a large, educated youth population that’s alienated from the mullahs and generals who rig elections and keep elected officials on short leashes. They face unpromising futures and have endured repeated, harsh repression including the imprisonment, torture, and deaths of thousands of friends. Peaceful protest brings nothing, a new approach may be coming.
Russian youths of the late nineteenth century turned from optimism and populism to nihilism and violence. Qaddafi repressed reformers and massacred several hundred of them in a prison yard. Libyans were prominent in AQ during its early days. Egyptian followers of the Muslim Brotherhood saw a thousand of their colleagues shot dead on Cairo streets back in 2013. Many are turning to AQ and ISIL in Sinai and several cities.
The major terror groups of the region are deeply hostile to Shiism – a heresy in their book. Indeed, they see sectarian warfare as creating the chaos from which the new caliphate will arise. However, already inside Iran are MEK, Arab, and Baloch militants who can teach organizational methods and supply weapons. The will is there.
The Russians who hurled bombs at the tsar’s carriage and shot high-ranking officials in courtrooms had little if any foreign help. Foreign powers, however, will likely help young Iranians with techniques and money. A small but portentous segment may be looking to violence as the only way to express the people’s will.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.