Brian M Downing
The long expected battle for Raqqa, the ISIL capital in north-central Syria, is underway. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of several militias, has begun encircling Raqqa. Soon the SDF will take surrounding villages, then prepare to assault the city itself.
The battle will be long and costly, repeating the Mosul campaign in northern Iraq. An SDF victory is hardly assured. What can happen in the course of the long battle? What will be going on in Ankara, Moscow, and Washington?
The SDF
The Mosul battle is proceeding only very slowly. Iraqi special forces leading the way are taking extremely high casualties, perhaps fifty percent. They’ve had to pull back at last once to rest and integrate replacements into the rank and file. The battle has been underway for almost four months now and the western half of the city has yet to be entered.
SDF troops taking positions around Raqqa are unlikely to be as effective as Iraqi counterparts in Mosul. The latter were put together many years ago – outside the venal networks of the regular army. Special forces officers are trained and promoted according to reasonably professional standards and their units have gained considerable combat experience in fights for Ramadi and Fallujah.
The SDF is a recent formation cobbled together from the militias of warlords and local notables. Combat experience has come against pockets of ISIL troops and rival rebel groups. Though valuable, these fights were not nearly as large as the one ahead.
Heterogeneity is valued in the West but it is a serious problem in the Middle East where it weakens if not cripples armies and poisons politics. The SDF do not have the ethnic homogeneity of Iraqi special forces, who are Shia Arab. Kurdish and Sunni troops have taken up blocking positions but are not side-by-side with the Shia special forces. ISIL troops are Sunni Salafists. SDF fighters and leaders are Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen. Each group has its own units and its own ideas as to what post-ISIL Syria should look like. This raises the possibility of disunity in the command structure and mistrust of units operating alongside each other. It makes discord if not open fighting at some point a virtual certainty.
Slow progress and high casualties are certain as the SDF come up against experienced and motivated ISIL troops fighting from well prepared positions in urban landscapes. Minefields, snipers, bunker complexes, and truck bombs lie ahead as the fighting goes block by block. Infighting and paralysis may be in store for the SDF. The offensive may be stalemated or even driven back.
Outside help to the SDF
Iraqi forces are not far from Raqqa. They could provide valuable reinforcements and knowledge of ISIL tactics in urban settings. They are, however, preoccupied with Mosul for the time being and preparing for domestic conflicts in coming months – including some between each other. Further, most Iraqi troops are Shia and would be unwelcome. Iraqi Kurds are similarly preoccupied. And Turkey, upon whom they depend for oil exports, would vigorously oppose aiding Syrian Kurds aligned with Kurds in its restive Turkish areas. There is some possibility that Sunni tribal levies from western Iraq will help. But they too are unlikely to leave Iraq for fear that the Kurds and Shia will retake even more Sunni land than they have in the last year.
In regard to intelligence on ISIl tactics in urban warfare, American personnel near the Mosul fighting are sending information on to counterparts with the SDF.
American troops are already with SDF troops – training, advising, and helping with the immense logistics needed for the campaign. If the battle is stalemated or turned back, the new American president might provide more than advisors and airstrikes. Battalion-size units could be sent to bolster flagging spirits or block an ISIL counterattack. He has already spoken boldly of hitting Islamist militants and ordered a commando strike in Yemen against al Qaeda.
Russia and Turkey are already collaborating against ISIL pockets in northwestern Syria. They are also expanding their influence in the Middle East – at the expense of the United States. Intervening in the battle for Raqqa would help in both regards.
Russia can deliver airstrikes, especially in dense urban areas that the US would avoid. Raqqa is only sixty miles from the Turkish border. Turkish mechanized infantry could reach it in a day or two, despite any agreement with Washington to stay out of the battle.
Russia and Turkey will be even better positioned to present themselves to the SDF, or at least its non-Kurdish elements, as more reliable supporters than the US. Washington is wary of further involvement in the Syrian civil war and the new president has issued contradictory messages on involvements in the Middle East.
American support obviously rests on Turkish military bases that can be closed on short notice, leaving the SDF with no choice but to rely on Ankara and Moscow in the future and reduce ties to Washington.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.