The generals and the conflict with Iran

Brian M Downing 

The Trump administration’s Iran policy stumbles ahead. An attack was authorized, then suddenly called back. The president spoke of making Iran great again, then returned to threats. The only clear thing coming from last week’s step back from war is that our generals and admirals are not supportive of their president. 

The depth of their opposition cannot be discerned from outside the inner rings of the Pentagon. However, there are several reasons for the brass’s position.

Generational shifts

Since the end of World War Two the senior officer corps, generals and admirals, have had varying beliefs about the advisability of foreign interventions. Flush from victory in 1945, they thought they could accomplish anything by sending enough troops and materiel. The Korean War ended that optimism and “no land war in Asia” was all but chiseled above Pentagon entrances. 

However a decade later, the chiefs sent division after division into S Vietnam and dropped huge amounts of ordnance on the North. That led to another period of restraint when the captains and majors at Dak To and Khe Sanh got their stars.

By the new century, the Vietnam-era generals were dwindling in both number and influence. The 1991 Iraq war brought a return to the overweening confidence of 1945 which when fused with the anger and eagerness to strike back after 9/11, led to injudicious wars and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The captains and majors who fought in the Korengal and at Fallujah are getting their stars now. They see Afghanistan and Iraq as costly, protracted wars that have not increased our security, only overstretched our commitments. More recently, we’ve begun an open-ended commitment in eastern Syria. Generals see their troops, especially pilots and special forces, worn down from years of deployments.

Strategic priorities

While US forces are tied down in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, more important dangers are out there. Russia has invaded the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, consolidated positions in Syria and Venezuela, and undermined democracies in the West.

China is expanding its naval and air power along its periphery. Economically, it’s coming to dominate the Eurasian land mass and control key commodities such as iron, copper, and rare earths. 

The Sino-Russian alignment is the main threat to western security and democratic values. The generals have been trying to reduce forces in peripheral conflicts and concentrate on Russia and China. Conflict with Iran might be long and costly. It undoubtedly would be a strategic distraction. 

 

Allies

The generals see the  administration’s Iran policy worsening ties with allies in Europe and Asia at a critical point in Cold War Two. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, India, Taiwan, and S Korea want low oil prices and as little conflict as possible in the Persian Gulf. 

US pressure on allies to stop purchases of Iranian crude and otherwise slash trade with Tehran are causing resentment. They see Iran not as a threat but as a potentially lucrative trading partner.

As during the Vietnam war, allies are dismayed by our lack of focus on major threats as we get bogged down in ill-advised adventures of dubious national security, based on questionable intelligence.

The White House and the intelligence community 

The administration bases its Iran policy on assertions that Iran is continuing its work on nuclear weapons. The claim was made throughout Trump’s presidential campaign and repeated in countless statements and tweets. It’s become a common sense, of sorts.

Lost in the flurry of activity and rumors in recent weeks is the CIA’s position on the matter. Langley insists that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA. This echoes a National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 that found Iran had stopped its nuclear program in 2003. The Pentagon and CIA have a long history of overlaps and affinities, and there is no disagreement on Iran. 

The administration’s claims, then, rest not on the careful findings of the intelligence community but on the tendentious interests of Washington think tanks and Iran’s regional enemies.

The mistrust between the generals and Trump also rests on a slew of lesser issues: his aberrant defenses of Russia; his erratic, belligerent, and mendacious nature; his disregard for Generals McMaster, Kelly, and Mattis and his humiliating dismissal of all three. There’s also his solicitousness toward Sunni princes who preside over feckless armies and use their money to get others to do their fighting.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.