Brian M Downing
The view here has been that longstanding flaws and high casualties have rendered the Russian army incapable of meaningful offensive operations. Undaunted, Moscow has rallied the nation with WW2 analogies, drafted hundreds of thousands of men, and positioned them for attack. A winter offensive is underway, seeking to make a decisive breakthrough or inflict unacceptable losses. An army built upon quantity over quality and ardor over training has advantages but also disadvantages.
Disadvantages
Mobilizing hundreds of thousand of men and sending them into battle without adequate training, equipment, or leadership appeals to romantic notions of the past but it’s a dubious approach now, especially against a trained enemy. Attackers are showing incredible tenacity and that attests to the effectiveness of propaganda. However, troops have .ittle tactical skill. Early in the war, Russian armor attacked without infantry support. Now Russian infantry attacks without armor support. Months of assaults around Bakhmut have taken only a few miles. Losses are enormous.
A larger army puts greater strain on logistics. Troops are expending large amounts of ammunition. Food, water, and heat sources are needed. The wounded need to be evacuated. The army’s supply system proved inadequate at the war’s outset and little reform has come. Supply dumps have been hit hard by Ukrainian artillery and drones, forcing the Russians to make depots smaller and farther from front positions. The situation will worsen when spring comes and roads become mud pits.
Russia has lost at least 1,600 main battle tanks, many more other armored vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft. They cannot be readily replaced as they require hi-tech which sanctions have made difficult to get. Factories cannot churn them out as they did before the war. Ukraine is getting more sophisticated arms every week.
Kyiv’s figures of 140,000 Russian dead are probably quite high but even when lowered one-third they’re astounding, especially when adding the wounded – roughly three times the dead. Mass infantry tactics increase the toll everyday. And as Ukraine fights a defense-in-depth, giving up ground only after inflicting losses, Russian casualties will remain high.
Two wars
The Russians are refighting World War Two but an army doesn’t go twice onto the same battlefield. The Red Army took huge casualties in WW2. The nation was united in repelling the invaders. Most Russians support the Ukraine war but In the last year several hundred thousand young men have fled abroad to avoid service and more light out everyday. Some attack induction centers and other sites related to the war.
Stalin’s army machine had a system of domestic factories behind it, many of which had been strategically built far from western borders. The US sent oil, trucks, planes, and other materiel. Allies relieved pressure by fighting the Axis in North Africa, Italy, and France before crossing the Siegfried Line and entering Germany in the fall of 1944. Putin’s factories face shortages, shutdowns, and occasional acts of sabotage. Foreign help is limited to Chinese technology, Iranian drones, and a few thousand foreign fighters.
The Russian public will accept casualties and hardships but in time will want signs of progress. Six months after Barbarossa began, the Russian army drove the Reich from the gates of Moscow. A year later it encircled von Paulus’s army at Stalingrad and a year after that it blunted a German drive around Kursk. Germany never regained the initiative and was pushed back to Berlin. Thus far there are no signs of progress save from the pens of propagandists and sycophants. The ongoing Russian offensive in the Donbas is unlikely to fare better than the German one around Kursk.
When leaders send national traditions to war, they put them on the line. With victory, leaders and traditions are proven right and annealed by fire. Defeat brings discredit and turmoil. At some point, without signs of progress, Putin’s invocations of the Great Patriotic War will ring as hollow as the ones the Romanovs made from 1914 to 1917.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.