The president takes on the Pakistani generals  

Brian M Downing 

President Trump issued a warning to Pakistan last January and this week he cut $300 million in military aid to our putative ally. Other forms of aid are continuing, however. The reason for the cuts is Islamabad’s support for the Taliban, which has been gaining ground in rural districts and inflicting serious casualties on the Afghan army.

The cuts may reflect concerns with a faltering war effort or the president’s mercurial temperament and impatience, but Pakistan’s duplicity is unmistakable. The president’s actions are justifiable. They are also counterable. How will Pakistan respond? And more importantly, how will China take advantage of the situation? 

Our ally

Pakistan’s generals took the Taliban under its wing in the 90s when they saw the militant group as a means of establishing trade with Central Asia and limiting India’s influence there. The generals also supported al Qaeda which had aligned with the Taliban through the assistance of Jalaluddin Haqqani, patriarch of the Haqqani network who died this week, apparently of natural causes. That’s a rarity in his line of work.

Pakistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Haqqanis fought side by side to control Afghanistan but encountered fierce resistance from the Northern Alliance. Pakistani generals found al Qaeda helpful in training Kashmiri guerrillas, including the Lashkar-i-Taiba, which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai massacre. 

More recently, Pakistan extends ad hoc support to ISIL’s regional affiliate, IS-Khorasan, though the same can be said of US allies in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Pakistan, then, is not the US’s only dubious ally.

Pakistan’s response

Islamabad will not break with the Taliban and the kindred groups ensconced along the Af-Pak frontier. That would risk losing influence in the north and commerce with Central Asia. It would also lead to revulsion over a perceived insult to the nation’s honor, triggering public turmoil and the wrath of  Pakistan’s own Taliban – the TTP.

Pakistan will respond somehow though. Predictably, angry demonstrations have already begun – some spontaneous, some not. Supply routes from Pakistani ports into Afghanistan may be closed down. The only other supply route runs through Russia and its client-state, Uzbekistan.

Pakistan has closed the critical supply routes before, though only for a short while. The country benefits greatly from tolls and unemployed truckers complain vocally. The cuts and coming response underscore the unreliable nature of US supply lines into the landlocked Central Asian country.

China

Beijing has been gaining influence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan owing to its control of the former’s natural resources and its use of the latter’s roads and ports to export them. Pakistani generals see their relationship with China as insurance from significant American pressures. They are undoubtedly parleying with Chinese officials now.

Beijing wants to expand its influence in the world, especially if it comes at Washington’s expense – all the more so as a trade war is underway. However, China might not be as supportive as the Pakistani generals hope.

China is deeply worried about Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups. Beijing has invested heavily in Afghanistan and sees the Taliban and the like as keeping the country from becoming the mineralogical bonanza it was intended to be. China sees Central Asia much as Europe saw Africa and Asia in the 19th century – territory theirs for the taking. 

Pakistan-backed terrorist groups pose a far greater danger to China than they do to the US. The spread of Islamist militancy into the ‘Stans would present severe problems and the Uighurs in al Qaeda and IS-Khorasan pose dangers inside China. 

The Pakistani generals hoped to play the US and China off against one another. They prided themselves on their strategic adroitness. However, they may find themselves pressed by both powers. Soon the generals may face an onslaught from the Islamist militants they’ve long backed who see themselves as loyal allies now marginalized if not betrayed.

Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.