Reviewed by Brian M Downing
ISIL has lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria, though it’s still present in the arid, sparsely-populated lands straddling the two fragmented countries. The Islamist group also has a presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and surrounding areas. ISIL calls this region “Khorasan” – a venerable, near mythic name commonly found in apocalyptic tracts circulating in the Islamic world, attracting young men ardent for some desperate glory.
The tracts prophesize that mighty armies will gather there and go on to forge a new empire and usher in a new day. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has been there for several years, trying to build those mighty armies and fulfill their millenarian vision. They have considerable foreign support, some of it from nominal American allies.
Antonio Giustozzi has written several excellent books on Afghanistan’s wars. For the present one, he’s interviewed American, Pakistani, Afghan, and Saudi officials, and even managed to communicate with IS-K personnel – an impressive and daunting undertaking. The result is an insightful, well-documented, and truly remarkable book on the Islamic State and the war-ravaged region it seeks to dominate.
Jihadistan
Giustozzi notes the multitude of warrior groups in and near Afghanistan which probably attracted ISIL. The Taliban is of course the largest and best known, but nearby are the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Haqqani network, Baloch insurgents in both Pakistan and Iran, al Qaeda, Lashkar-i-Taiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and various Uighur fighters shifting from group to group. With the partial exception of the Taliban, these groups share the Islamic State’s vision of global jihad and empire.
Initially, IS-K recruited and trained fighters for wars in the Levant – a task assisted by the TTP and Haqqanis. Over the last few years, however, emphasis has shifted to establishing a position in Afghanistan, bringing the numerous and fractious jihadi groups under their control, then conquering the region. IS-K is also keen on exacting revenge for setbacks elsewhere.
Support
Local backing varies across time and place. Initially, IS-K cells did not extract revenue from Afghans, preferring to avoid conflict with locals and the Taliban. In time, however, the cells imposed taxes, seized mines, and took hostages for ransom. Early on they avoided the opium business, preferring to brand the Taliban as violators of Sharia for dealing in the trade. Times changed.
IS-K relies heavily on foreign benefactors. Individuals, mostly from Gulf states, send money because of Salafist affinities, hatred of Shiism, and fear of Iranian power. Many donors want vengeance for Russian and Iranian intervention in Syria – a desire shared by their princes.
Giustozzi’s source within Saudi intelligence indicates that the Kingdom has supported ISIL and its precursor entities since their days as a Sunni oppositional force in Iraq (a view long shared here1). Saudi Arabia is presently supporting IS-K in order to co-opt the Islamist outfit and divert it from attacks inside the Kingdom. Its success is unclear.
The Saudis are deeply concerned by Iran’s growing influence in Afghanistan. Tehran’s support for the Shia Hazaras and the old Northern Alliance goes back to the Russian war of the 80s. More recently the IRGC has been backing the Taliban, Haqqanis, and Afghanistan’s Muslim Brotherhood groups. The Saudis want IS-K to detach these groups from Iran and become a fearsome proxy on the Islamic Republic’s eastern periphery and in its restive Baloch region.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are at odds these days but they both support IS-K and want it to wreak havoc in the ‘Stans to punish Russia for thwarting their efforts to oust Assad. Russia, in turn, supports the Taliban to oppose this. So, we have the jarring paradox of the US’s friends in Riyadh and Doha supporting IS-K, and its enemies in Tehran and Moscow opposing it.
Organization
Foreign support has helped IS-K become a significant force in the crowded field of jihadi groups in Af-Pak. IS-K troops are better paid and supplied than Taliban peers, despite the latter’s proximity to Pakistani military networks. Foreign backers bring in supplies to Pakistan, sometimes in the guise of relief missions, where they are hefted over the frontier to IS-K cells, perhaps even ferried in by helicopter.
Superior finances allow IS-K to attract experienced fighters and commanders from rival groups into their ranks. About 50% of its cadres and 83% of its rank and file have come over from the Taliban and TTP. IS-K assigns key positions on the basis of experience and merit, whereas Taliban leaders achieve positions through tribal and kinship connections. IS-K fighters have greater group identity and unit morale.
Propaganda divisions spread word that the Taliban are deeply involved with the unholy opium trade and a Shia power as well. They also claim the Taliban lack a global revolutionary outlook, are pawns of Pakistani intelligence, and are incapable of winning the war against Kabul and its backers. IS-K could once point to impressive victories in the Levant to give credence to its vision of conquering Khorasan and restoring empire. Taliban victories are by comparison small and fleeting.
Future
IS-K has parlayed its resources into a sizable but less than fearsome army. Estimates of strength vary from a few thousand to 8,500 – substantially less than ISIL’s 35,000 or so fighters before its defeats at Mosul and Raqqa, though some of course are stealing their way to Khorasan.
Giustozzi notes IS-K’s limitations. Every movement has factions and personal rivals. ISIL, after all, broke away from al Qaeda and warred with the loyal affiliate in Syria. The Taliban uneasily hold together numerous tribal levies. IS-K has disputes over leadership and strategy. Its large international contingent (Arab, Uighur, Uzbek) rankles longstanding Afghan concerns with foreign presences – all the more so as they extract revenue and instill fear through grisly executions. Furthermore, IS-K’s hardline Salafism clashes with the moderate religiousness of most Afghans which for example allows for shrines to revered holy figures – abhorrences to strict understandings of monotheism.
ISIL’s defeats in Syria and Iraq have brought diminishing prestige for IS-K. The shining victories of 2014 led to awe, respect, and recruitment boons. The IMU deserted al Qaeda for IS-K back then, but has more recently returned to al Qaeda. The IS-K campaign seems to have stalled. However, Giustozzi notes the concern among regional intelligence officers that a Taliban-Kabul settlement would lead to thousands of experienced fighters quitting the Taliban for IS-K. Another jarring paradox.
It might be added that the US has been reasonably successful in killing off IS-K leaders through drone and air strikes. And given the rivalry between IS-K and much of the Taliban, it might be suspected that the older, more established group has provided the US timely intelligence. It’s long been believed that the Taliban eliminated unruly commanders this way.
Foreign support is in any event likely to continue. Gulf states fear Shia power and see IS-K and its proven fighters as a formidable ally. Opulent princes and ascetic jihadis alike want Iran and Russia to pay a heavy price for Syria. The ‘Stans beckon.
1 “A Saudi beacon for Iraq’s Sunni militias” Asia Times 27 Jul 2011.
The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad by Antonio Giustozzi. (London: Hurst Publishers, 2018).
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.