Brian M Downing
The last few months have seen numerous demonstrations in Iraq – some large and violent. They protest government incompetence and corruption but often mask the designs of the mercurial Muqtada al Sadr. Scion of a family of revered Shia clerics who opposed Saddam Hussein, Sadr has at times warred against the Baghdad government, other times supported it. Now he has a chance to control it.
Washington has long deemed Sadr an agent in Iran’s efforts to control post-Saddam Iraq. The view here has been that Sadr is chiefly loyal to himself and wants to control Iraq through his hold on political and clerical offices. Foreign support figures in his plans but he’s looking more to Saudi Arabia than Iran, at least for now.
Iraq in the middle
The 2003 US invasion ended the dominance of Iraq’s 17% Sunni-Arab minority and handed power to its 60% Shia-Arab people. Not long thereafter, Neoconservatives decried Iraq’s shift toward Iran – paradoxical as they ousted the Sunnis and made way for the Shia majority. Paradoxical, and untrue. The Shia government allotted oil licenses to US firms and opted for US military hardware, trainers, and counter-terrorism teams. When ISIL overran the north, Baghdad called Washington.
In the last two years a Saudi-Israeli-American entente has formed, determined to weaken Iran, if not break it apart along ethnic and sectarian lines. The US has abandoned the JCPOA, reimposed sanctions, and otherwise undermined Iran’s economy. The entente wants to expel Iranian troops from Syria, isolate Hisbollah, and greatly reduce Tehran’s influence in Iraq. PM Abadi has accepted sanctions on Iran but declined to openly side with the entente. After recent elections, his political future is in doubt.
Enter Sadr
Both Sunnis and Shias battled the US after the 2003 invasion, though not cooperatively. Indeed, they often fought each other. The Sunni opposition comprised tribal levies, Salafist networks, the disbanded army, and al Qaeda. The Shia opposition comprised several militias, including Sadr’s. As the insurgency waned, Sadr fled to Iran, supposedly to pursue religious studies and become an ayatollah like his father and uncle, both of whom were killed by Saddam Hussein.
He returned to Iraq and to politics. His movement helped fight ISIL and supported the Abadi government at key moments. Last year he parleyed with the Saudi heir apparent, Mohammed bin Salman – a rare and puzzling encounter between Sunni prince and Shia cleric. Since then, Sadr has called for disbanding Iraq’s Shia militias, some of which are IRGC-supported. He emerged from recent controversial elections as head of a powerful bloc, though he himself is not positioned to hold office.
In recent months Sadr has been directing protests which have taken on an anti-Iran stance. Demonstrators called for an end to Tehran’s meddling and even set fire to an Iranian consulate in Basra.
Sunni prince and Shia cleric may have found common ground. Sadr will drive out Iranian influence and the Saudis will support him diplomatically and financially and help keep Iraq’s restive Sunni population under Baghdad’s control. The US and Israel will find this amenable and desirable.
Implications
Such a deal would be a remarkable and portentous coup. The young prince would be well on his way to regional hegemony and dynastic mastery. The once feared Shia solidarity would be broken. Lines of communication connecting Tehran to Syria and Hisbollah would be further jeopardized.
Iranian leaders must fear that key alignments are falling away. Their position in Syria is becoming untenable as Israel hits IRGC and Hisbollah positions with impunity and Russia moves closer to Israel. What will become of Hisbollah? The Houthis of Yemen?
Iraq is already home to Kurdish opponents of Iran and to the MEK, both of which have struck inside Iran. Tehran may have signaled concern by a recent missile attack on a Kurdish insurgent headquarters in northern Iraq. With Iraq closer to the entente powers, it could become a base for more aggressive attacks on Iran. A full invasion is highly unlikely but Tehran will have to build up its western defenses.
Countermoves
Iran has a few options. Supporting Iraq’s Kurds against Baghdad is unlikely as it would further embolden Iran’s own Kurdish separatists. Tehran could, however, link Kurdistan’s oil with its pipeline system running from Tabriz to Gulf export terminals – an annoyance but hardly a bold countermeasure.
Support Iraqi separatists in the Sunni west? Unlikely, as this would expand Sunni and Saudi power one day and justify increased foreign support to Iran’s own separatists. Similarly, IRGC attacks on US personnel in Iraq would justify fierce retaliation.
Coalitions do not come easily in Iraq. Negotiations go on for months and require foreign pressure – from the US and sometimes from Iran. Sadr may be unable to form an enduring government and of course Iran will be able to play upon political divisions, especially in Shia groups already hostile to Sadr and appalled by shadowy ties with Sunni princes. Iraq may descend once more into chaos.
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Sadr may be playing both sides: shifting to Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Washington for the time being, then warming up to Tehran. He’ll draw support from both sides as each fears losing a pivotal region to the other. Tito played this game quite well during the Cold War, as did Nasser for several years.
An opportunistic balancer, Sadr can build domestic support from both Sunnis and Shias and upon the death of 88-year-old Ayatollah Sistani, impose himself as a religious authority – a younger, more politically engaged ayatollah, who rules post-Saddam Iraq in conjunction with beholden politicians.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.