Reviewed by Brian M Downing
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been central to Iran’s domestic and foreign security since the war with Iraq in the 80s. Afterward it expanded into many parts of the state, economy, and society. Recently it’s been active in Iraq and Syria. Today the IRGC is a target of American, Saudi, and Israeli attacks, financial and otherwise.
Ostovar sees the IRGC as emerging from templates of clerical-directed militants, veneration of religious authority, and recent conflicts in the region.
Clerical militias
The late 19th century saw Shia clerics mobilize fervent toughs to fight secularism, westernization, non-Persians, and democracy. The Koran alone, they held, provided the basis for proper life.
In the decade after World War Two, when Mohammad Mossadegh tried to modernize Iran, these clerical militias violently opposed him and threw their support to the Pahlavi monarchy. Paradoxically, the clergy and their militants helped in the MI6/CIA coup that ousted Mossadegh and brought back the shah.
Support for the crown was of course short-lived as by the 60s Pahlavi had embarked on a modernization program more sweeping and successful than Mossadegh’s. The shah went into exile, Khomeini returned to cheering crowds.
Clerical militants enjoyed a new day as fevered bands of various orientations sprang up around the country – some religious, some secular. Militias calling themselves the “Guardians of the Islamic Republic” coalesced, developed ties to Khomeini’s revolutionary councils, and suppressed rival bands (Tudeh, Fadai, and MeK) and minority movements (Arab, Kurdish, and Baloch).
The Guardians soon sided with the clergy against the provisional government. Theocracy won out over secularism and democracy.
Religious authority
The IRGC’s devotion to the Supreme Leader is obviously strong, from rank and file to commanding generals. Ostovar attributes this to the IRGC’s descent from similar bands in the region’s history and to a fierce loyalty to the Islamist revolution which forms the IRGC’s raison d’etre.
Central Asia has seen a long string of religious powerholders who surround themselves with a warrior retinue. Ostovar cites the Janissaries and Mamluks as predecessors. The Ottoman troops had a caliph, the IRGC have a Supreme Leader.
The author believes devotion to religious leadership makes the IRGC’s assumption of power unlikely. The elite military’s reason for being and dominant ideology is service to Islamist government. (He doesn’t mention the Mamluks’ revolt against the Ottomans.)
Conflicts
During the Iraq war the IRGC expanded in numbers and importance. Early on, its spirited troops launched guerrilla raids and suicidal attacks which helped blunt Saddam’s offensive. Morale and dedication were high, instilled by propaganda campaigns stressing martyr narratives and promising to take Karbala, site of Ali Hussein’s tomb, and eventually Jerusalem and al Aqsa.
The IRGC was less effective on entering Iraq as enemy troops fought from better defensive positions on home soil. The Guard elite vied with the regular army for equipment and recruits. It fared quite well, increasing in size from 25,000 to 350,000 between 1980 and 1986. The IRGC was no longer a collection of street brawlers and latter-day dervishes. It was a modern army, the equal of the country’s regular army, and eventually its superior.
The IRGC took on internal security roles, stamping out dissidents and organizing an immense number of irregular fighters (Basij) who engaged in internal repression at home and human-wave assaults on the front.
Cessation of hostilities in 1988 brought no general demobilization of the IRGC. The mullahs awarded it scores of no-bid contracts to rebuild the country – the birth of an Egyptian-Pakistani model of military management of the commanding heights. Internal security roles expanded. The Basij ranks swelled to some 4 million. They established presences in schools, mosques, and associations to maintain their idea of a proper religious-nationalist spirit.
Convinced that international support was critical to the revolution’s survival, the IRGC’s Quds Force built ties with and trained the militias of Iraqi Shia, Syrian Alawi, Hisbollah, Hamas, and the PLO. It’s now engaged in fighting Syrian rebels and striking Saudi and Israeli targets around the world.
Ostovar’s treatment of the IRGC’s relationship to the regular army is sparse. The latter is often seen as resentful of the former’s primacy and boastfulness and as a potent opposition to the regime. However, this may be simply the forlorn hope of ex-pats, Likudniks, and Neoconservatives.
The author’s confidence in the primacy of clerics over generals will be tested in the next few years as a college of aged mullahs faces profound economic, political, and military problems and as experts in violence seek to defend their nation and further entrench their influence.
Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.