Brian M Downing
Gunmen attacked an IRGC parade in Iran’s Khuzestan province two weeks ago, killing 29 people and injuring twice that. An Arab separatist group has claimed responsibility, and so has ISIL. Tehran immediately blamed Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and foreign backers.
Earlier this week, the IRGC replied with a salvo of missiles, possibly Shabab-3s, into eastern Syria where ISIL still controls a swathe of land. Iranian drones are also thought to have struck back. Iran sent signals to enemies inside and outside the region.
Who did it?
Shortly after the attack, Tehran blamed Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Nonetheless, retaliation came to ISIL-held territory in Syria, near the Iraqi border. Iran is less interested in finding evidence than in showing resolve.
ISIL might indeed have been responsible. It’s struck inside Iran before and more than ever the leaders and fighters are determined to exact revenge for Iran’s intervention in Syria. (ISIL has the same determination regarding Russia.) Arab separatists might also be to blame. They too have struck before. Khuzestan is a predominately Arab region, rich in both oil and resentment toward Persian rule.
Foreign backing is possible even likely – for either ISIL or Arab separatists. As former Iranian president Bani Sadr recently commented, “[T]here is no such thing as an independent terrorist group and there never has been. [A]ll terrorism is the product of one or another regional powers meddling in the affairs of its neighbors.”
The exiled president politician might be on the mark. ISIL, especially its affiliate in Afghanistan, tries to unite regional separatist groups, though more the Balochs of southeastern Iran. Israel has already built ties with Kurdish militants and the MeK, and as a Saudi prince once noted, his intelligence service wasn’t very good at covert operations but it was highly accomplished at writing checks for them.
Signals
The IRGC was making it plain that it will not sit back as Sunni and allied powers endanger Iran. Their missiles have struck eastern Syria twice now – near Deir Azzour in 2017 and now to the south near Al-Bukamal. Iran’s Shabab-3 missiles can easily reach the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, including their oil facilities.
The Sunnis, however, have their own missiles and can pay Iran back in kind. A return to the violent exchanges of the Iran-Iraq War is possible, though of course the US, Britain, and France will not sit by as their Sunni allies and arms purchasers-in-chief run for cover. The Shabab-3 can also reach all Israel, but only the most fervently deluded general or mullah can fail to realize that a strike on Israel will bring swift, devastating, and utterly disproportionate retaliation.
The Shabab-3 can also reach Israel, but only the most fervently deluded general or mullah can fail to realize that a strike on Israel will bring swift, disproportionate, and devastating retaliation.
The US, Britain, France, and Arab-Kurdish forces known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintain positions east of the Euphrates. The Iranian retaliation wasn’t especially close by but it may have signaled intentions. Syria and Russia oppose the SDF positions as they prevent a full reconquest of the Assad demesne and pose an obstacle to lines of communication between Tehran and Shia allies on the Mediterranean. However, a Syrian-Iranian campaign in eastern Syria would meet with determined opposition from fortified positions and US airpower. It would almost certainly become a costly failure.
The generals and mullahs cannot be pleased with Russia’s coziness with Israel. The IDF has struck Iranian and Hisbollah positions over two hundred times in the last few years with little complaint from Putin. The Russian ruler declined to provide Assad the S-400 air defense system but he’s now giving him the less sophisticated S-300 system. That comes only after Syria accidentally shot down a Russian military aircraft, so Moscow may be acting less to bolster Iran’s position than to protect its military from friendly but inept fire – and to avoid appearing too close to Israel.
By striking in eastern Syria, Tehran is escalating regional tensions and pressing Moscow into stronger support. Iran wants Russia to convince Israel to ease up and the US to back down. Neither is likely.
The IRGC strike also sent signals to the home front. It needs to shore up domestic support and military strikes have historically been helpful in that endeavor. Presently many middle-class Iranians see the IRGC as holding up an archaic dictatorship, benefitting handsomely from state contracts and monopolies, and squandering resources in foreign wars. Swift reprisals for the Khuzestan attack demonstrate the ability to defend the nation, leaving reformists vulnerable to charges of disloyalty in time of war. In Iran, that’s more than rhetoric.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.