Brian M Downing
As the British and Russian Empires expanded into Central Asia in the 19th century, remote and seemingly irrelevant Afghanistan became contested. Each side sent emissaries to parley with its tribes and peoples. Ever since the days of Durand, Kipling, and Ignatiev, foreign powers have vied for influence and sent in armies, at least for a while.
There’ve been two major wars in Afghanistan since the late 70s. The Soviet Union deployed troops in 1979. The last of them ignominiously withdrew ten years later. The US and a broad coalition went in after the 9/11 attacks. Some are still there.
Conflicts unrelated to Afghanistan led to complications in both cases as rivals looked to inflict costs wherever possible. Policy makers today should take note. The war is no longer a straightforward insurgency. It hasn’t been one in years.
The Soviet war (1979-89)
During most of the Cold War, Afghanistan was under Moscow’s influence. The Kabul government embarked on a rapid modernization program which led to domestic opposition, then to large-scale foreign support to rebels.
The US and Pakistan encouraged the opposition. The Cold War was still underway and the US was smarting from the loss of Iran and the embassy seizure. Pakistan wanted to weaken its main adversary, India, which had been strengthening its position in Afghanistan along with its Soviet ally.
When the Soviet Union intervened in late 1979, the conflict became further complicated as much of the Islamic world came to the aid of the rebels. Saudi Arabia matched increasing US subsidies and helped recruit volunteers for the jihad. The same can be said of several Islamic countries, including revolutionary Iran, and of the international Muslim Brotherhood.
Paradoxes abound in the anti-Soviet camp. The US and Iran were on the same side, even while the embassy staff was held. Sunnis and Shia alike supported the rebels, as did American intelligence services and radical Islamists, including the Haqqanis, Hisb-i-Islami, and what would become the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Another paradox is that Kabul’s reforms, which triggered the war, included land reform and education for women.
The US war (2001- )
Initially, the US effort against the Taliban and al Qaeda had broad international support. NATO, Russia, and even Iran supported the US. Sweden sent a military contingent. Predictably, Pakistan remained wary of India and continued aiding the Taliban and al Qaeda.
American tensions with Iran and Russia began to affect the Afghan war a few years after the US intervention. More recently, Saudi-Iranian animosities have made themselves felt.
Iran has long been hostile to the Taliban. They are a Sunni extremist group that massacred an Iranian consulate staff in the 90s and has oppressed Afghanistan’s Shia. But Tehran finds the Taliban useful at times. When US-Iranian tensions built in 2006, and the US talked of attacking Iranian nuclear sites and regime change, Iran supplied the Taliban. It was a warning that more could come.
Support from Iran dwindled but has picked up. Tehran probably sees the Taliban as an eventual winner, at least in the Afghan south, and wants a modicum of influence with them. Iranian backing is paired with a similar Russian program that began with the emergence of Cold War Two. Both countries want to bleed the US in a landlocked Central Asian country.
Iran’s growing influence with the Taliban has alarmed Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has countered by supporting the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an ISIL affiliate operating in several districts of Afghanistan. Riyadh wants to bring IS-K into its fold and channel its violent energies against Iran. The Saudis hope one day to direct IS-K into Central Asia to destabilize Russia’s southern periphery. Iran and Russia must be punished for quashing Sunni rebels in Syria.
The implications for the US in Afghanistan are not good. The Taliban and IS-K both have foreign support from oil-producing rivals and the Taliban have less incentive to settle with Kabul. Central Asia faces Islamist insurgency and governmental disintegration. But that’s Russia’s problem.
Paradoxes abound here as well. Iran is supporting a Sunni movement and Saudi Arabia backs an Islamist group determined to destroy it. Each side thinks it can one day control militant forces deeply hostile to them. Each side might well regret its delusion of mastery which stems from sectarian hatred and diplomatic conceit.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.