Brian M Downing
Russia is planning an offensive in coming months. As noted earlier, the plan seems unwise to say the least. It’s based on dubious reports from below, official concerns in the state, and nationalistic cant all around. Cautious military analysis doesn’t seem to have figured. Shifting from hopes in Russia to realities in Ukraine, what if anything has changed in the Russian army to make this year’s drive more successful?
Unit leadership
The view here from war’s outset has been that the army’s officers and NCOs are not selected and promoted on professional standards. Careers are based on loyalties, connections, ability to impose harsh discipline on troops at home and direct their aggressiveness onto enemies.
Many armies recognize the need to reform. Prussia amid the Napoleonic Wars is a case in point. American Reserve and National Guard units had to be overhauled at the outset of WW2. When Omar Bradley took command of the lax, nepotism-ridden 28th Infantry Division (the Pennsylvania Guard unit) he had to rebuild it. It went on to perform ably in Normandy and soon thereafter march through the Arc de Triomphe. There is no evidence of a Bradley in the Russian army, despite pressing need.
Losses
Since the invasion began last February, Russia has suffered staggering losses in troops and equipment. Kyiv claims to have killed 122,000 Russian troops and destroyed 9,400 armored vehicles and 570 aircraft. The figures are almost certainly too high but reducing them 25% still leaves heavy losses. The battle deaths exceed those the US lost in both Korea and Vietnam.
Equipment is difficult to replace now. Sanctions make it hard to get semiconductors, optical devices, and communication gear. No sanctions regime has ever been as forceful as hoped. Russia is learning from Iran how to get what its army needs. Nonetheless, the Russian military will not be able to deploy as many tanks and aircraft as it did last year. And whatever armor and aircraft are deployed will face increasingly lethal Western arms.
Manpower
Moscow mobilized 300,000 men late last year and another levy is coming. There’s been significant opposition to induction but most Russians support the war and it’s reasonable to think most inductees do as well. However, Mobiks are poorly equipped and training is almost nonexistent. They’re swiftly sent to Ukraine and thrown into frontline positions. As the Great War poets told us, spirit only goes so far in modern warfare.
Another source of manpower is the prison system. Forty to fifty thousand former inmates are now serving in the war, mostly with the Wagner Group. The mercenary outfit hopes to use the war to become like Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps: an elite parallel army with industrial assets, the favor of their autocrat, and cunning leaders eager of more power.
The Group has directed prisoners’ aggressiveness, cruelty, and coarse nationalism into the war. By most accounts, and against expectations, the convicts have fought hard around Bakhmut, though it has not led to significant gains. Losses have been extremely high and this will sap willpower, regardless of how many Lee Marvins the Group has on hand.
Propaganda
The Kremlin has one notable success. It has mobilized and redeployed the memory of the Great Patriotic War. WW2 remains vibrant in Russian life. Every family has proud veterans and dreadful recollections. Russia is imperiled once more as Ukraine and its Western backers, including Germany, are at the gates. The comparison rings true in the ranks and public alike, damning the discontent of last summer for its ignorance and disloyalty.
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Casualties, equipment losses, and low-quality replacements do not augur well for the impending Russian offensive. It’s likely to be as poorly led, costly, and fruitless as before. Failure will greatly strengthen prospects for Ukraine’s offensives, including one aiming to liberate Crimea. Deeper turmoil in the Russian army and state loom.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.