Brian M Downing
When the Baghdad government ordered US troops out late in Bush the Younger’s second administration, it seemed we were rid of a bad situation. Shortly thereafter, however, AQ began to reconstitute in Sunni regions and Baghdad asked for US counterterrorism help. It was granted. In 2014 ISIL conquered the north with little resistance and another call went to Washington. It was answered.
We’re still there. However, the position is becoming tenuous, worsened by the administration’s Iran policy. What are we hoping to achieve there and why are things deteriorating?
The presence
US personnel are in place to suppress ISIL. The jihadi caliphate is gone but the fighters have reconstituted themselves as an underground guerrilla force. They receive limited support from disaffected Sunnis, Salafi fundamentalists, and remnants of Saddam’s army. Owing to weak and corrupt governance, sectarian hatreds, and an immense youth population, ISIL will be able to maintain an underground presence in Iraq (and elsewhere in the region) for years to come, perhaps a generation.
US troops also train and advise the Iraqi army. This is especially true of the elite units who spearheaded the war against ISIL. Without US assistance, these units will not perform well against ISIL bands, indigenous militias, or popular insurrection.
American troops in Iraq support US and other western forces in eastern Syria and an amalgam of Arab and Kurdish militias. Without support in Iraq, those western forces would be in an isolated, landlocked region where they are generally disliked. So, the presence in Syria justifies the one across the border.
If these justifications are accepted, as they presently are in Washington, it means the US presence in Iraq could go on indefinitely.
Decaying domestic politics
There is no government in Iraq at present. Coalitions are hard to come by, proposed PMs withdraw their names after fruitless dialog, and public unrest is growing. The state is incapable of concerted action and its collapse, along the lines of Libya, is a possibility.
The public is restive and increasingly vocal in opposing foreign presences, despite being shot down by the score. In recent months Iran has been the target of their rage. More recently it’s the US. Militias are becoming more important than the state, and many of them are now violently opposed to a US presence, often with foreign guidance.
Iran
The administration abandoned the JCPOA and began ratcheting up pressure on Iran with sanctions and threats. This has occurred despite little support for claims that Iran had violated the JCPOA from US intelligence services or key allies.
Iranian-backed militias have long been attacking US positions but in the last week the attacks have become more numerous and lethal. This is the IRGC’s response to the killing of the renowned Soleimani. Other militias will be tempted to win popular support and legitimize their warlords by conducting strikes of their own. US responses have no deterrent effect; they only increase popular hostility.
Iran is willing to match any US escalation, perhaps by providing the militias with more sophisticated equipment as they did during the insurgency after Saddam’s ouster. Russia and China will back Iran with political support and possibly even with the deployment of military assets. Both powers are eager to see the US back down and in time withdraw – with as little dignity as possible.
We are in a no-win conflict. Four outcomes are possible.
– The conflict could go on as is for the foreseeable future. The US accepts the casualties and risk of escalation and hopes that a stable government coalesces.
– The US could recognize the lack of progress in, and perhaps even the wrongheadedness of its Iran policy, and ease up the pressure. There is no assurance that Iran would ease up though.
– The US could reexamine the risk-reward ratio and strategic priorities and withdraw from Iraq, perhaps leaving only a counterterrorism unit with a small footprint.
– In the face of popular opposition and increasing militia strength, Baghdad may order the US to pull out, as it did in 2008. This could come about with behind-the-scenes negotiations from the US.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.