The US takes on China, part two 

Brian M Downing 

The contest with China is on. But how much domestic support can Washington mobilize, especially compared to what Beijing can command?

Anti-Chinese sentiment 

There’s been considerable antipathy toward what was once called Red China since the days of the Cold War. Back then “Beiping” was deemed a recklessly expansionist ally of the comparatively reasonable Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China in ’72 helped end the Vietnam War and began a period of comity. 

At the time, it seemed to be a masterful move against the Soviet Union – “playing the China card,” as it was called. When China became more prosperous and ambitious, comity ended, rivalry began, and animosities returned. 

China is well known to have taken millions of American jobs, though of course American corporations are willing parts of the process. Trade agreements continue the drain and though recent negotiations promise change, little has come yet. Chinese businesses buy up American concerns while closing off reciprocal moves. The purchases are poised to grow rapidly as many American firms near bankruptcy, though the administration may block more buyouts.

The PLA expands its presence around the periphery through illegal means, menaces American and allied craft, and mocks the power prestige Americans have prided themselves on for decades. Perhaps more importantly, many Americans fear their nation’s decline and China’s ascent.

Domestic support and opposition

The president will find ready support from his base and from blue-collar workers who see conflict bringing more jobs back home. However, most of the latter are already firmly in his camp. The corporate world will only be partially supportive though. Many CEOs, money managers, and shareholders appreciate China’s low-cost production and its burgeoning middle classes with booming disposable incomes and western tastes.

The notion of free trade, the idea advanced 200 years ago by David Ricardo and others, was widely believed until 2016 when Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump both derided it. Even Hillary Clinton, who once boasted of bringing us NAFTA, got on board. Nonetheless, free trade retains considerable institutional support in well-funded think tanks and lobbies.

Any president will face tremendous partisan opposition no matter how historically critical the issue and how compelling the arguments. Trump will face determined and opportunistic opposition on anything he offers, save for immense disbursements of borrowed money. 

The Democrats will have to find ways of attacking Trump’s China policy without sounding defensive of Chinese autocracy. The arguments may be surmised: It will cause the prices of food and manufactured goods to go up sharply. The administration’s rhetoric is bumptious, racist and responsible for increased hate crime against many minorities. The policy will also be decried as jingoistic and likely to cause miscalculation and military conflict.

In order to build a response to China, the president will have to persuasively articulate the implications of its ascent for the world economy, geopolitics, and democratic institutions. Heretofore he’s been unable to act like a statesman or consensus seeker. And a pivotal moment in history might elude us.

© 2020 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.