Brian M Downing
Moscow has had a number of disappointments in the Middle East over the years. During the Cold War it backed Arab states against Israel and its western backers and even goaded them into starting wars. The disastrous results were showcases of second-rate Soviet hardware and corrupt, inept regional armies.
Following NATO interventions in the Balkans and Libya, Putin was desperate to demonstrate Russia’s ability and determination to defend allies. Today, Syria is reasonably secure but Russia is encountering trouble with both Damascus and Tehran. Putin is in the uncomfortable position of balancing the interests of Syria and Iran against those of Israel and Turkey.
Russia’s objectives
Though pockets of resistance persist and foreign troops hold positions along the Turkish and Iraqi borders, the civil war is largely over. Russia wants to consolidate its position and establish security for its two airfields and naval base along the Mediterranean. It’s made enemies there.
One option would be to use Russian troops. However, that would involve logistical headaches, irk local sensibilities, and guarantee casualties for decades to come. A second would be to rely on the Syrian military, but Putin has rejected that too. Instead, he’s aligning with independent militias for security, mostly Syrian-Arab in composition.
Naturally, the Syrian state opposes the solidification of independent militias. It wants a powerful, unified military beholden to Damascus’s rulers, not Moscow’s paymasters. Iran wants the same thing as a counterpoise to Israel. Both are disappointed. There are suspicions that Iranian-backed fighters have clashed with Russian militias.
Russia’s decision
The option of building up local militias independent of Syria and Iran was done for three reasons. First, years of experience in the Middle East has caused Moscow to despair of building effective military forces. Russian generals look back to the wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973 and see repeated indecision, communication failure, and rivalry. In 1982, the Syrian military dueled with the Israeli air force and lost 85 jets and 30 SAM batteries. Israel lost a single drone.
The Syrian army fared poorly against rebel forces in recent years, despite the latter’s lack of unity and infighting. Even after Hisbollah and Iran sent in troops, the result was only a costly stalemate. The vaunted IRGC troops suffered high casualties and gained little territory.
Second, Russia is eager to mollify Turkey and keep it at odds with NATO. Russia and its local militias will try to control the Syrian-Turkish border and reduce the threat to Turkey from Kurdish guerrillas. Efforts to attract Kurdish troops who, after all, have proven themselves the ablest fighters in the region, have not met with success thus far.
Third, Russia must maintain good terms with Israel. That’s essential. Russia buys hi-tech from Israel, earns revenue by developing its oil and gas fields in the Mediterranean, and uses a pipeline running from Ashkelon to Eilat to send Russian oil to new markets. Israel naturally wants the Syrian army to remain fragmented, unprofessional, and incompetent.
Israel also expects Russia to keep Syria on a short leash. No state has ever attacked Israel without Russian support and none today would initiate hostilities without it. Looking ahead, Israel will likely press Russia to convince Iran to withdraw from Syria entirely. The IDF routinely attacks inside Syria without complaint from Moscow. When Syria asked Moscow for a more sophisticated air-defense system, a Russian official replied, evidently seriously, that Syria didn’t need it.
Putin must be seeing enormous complications stemming from his Syrian intervention. Its military bases will be targets as long as they are there, the Syrian army and state are weak and of dubious strategic value, and the increased presence forms problems with regional allies. Welcome to the Middle East, Mr Putin.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.