Brian M Downing
Yemen is in the middle of its third civil war between north and south. None of the conflicts has been sectarian to most Yemenis, even though the north is Shia and the south Sunni. The disputes have been regional in nature – the result of the north being under Ottoman rule, the south under British influence.
Outsiders, however, chiefly Saudi Arabia and Iran, have imposed sectarian passions and interests onto the desolate country. This is somewhat paradoxical as in a previous war the Saudis backed the Shia north.
The fighting has gone on for three years now. The Houthis of the north drove deep into the south but failed to take Aden and encountered opposition from the Sunni population. Since then, the Houthis have been pushed back. The fight is on for Hodeida, a large port under Houthi control. Without it, the Houthis will lose sources of weapons and revenue. And the people of the north will lose one of their few sources of food.
The battle
Troops from south Yemen, the UAE, and Sudan, are besieging Hodeida. The Houthis were superior fighters early on but have been worn down and are losing local support. They have the advantage of fighting from defensive positions and may adopt the block-by-block tactics of ISIL fighters at Mosul and Raqqa.
But as with ISIL, the Houthis have neither airpower nor sophisticated antiaircraft weapons. Their defensive positions will be vulnerable to airstrikes from Saudi and allied jets. The US is helping with intelligence.
The Houthis may believe that despite their lack of airpower, they can inflict serious casualties on attacking forces. High losses could bring fissures in the Sunni coalition, especially as Saudi ground troops remain in the rear with the gear, as a derogatory GI expression goes. Losses could also bring discontent in Sudan and the Emirates.
A Houthi win
What if the Houthis use experience and defensive advantages to defeat the Sunni attack? It could be a short-term setback followed by regrouping, firing a few generals, and renewing the campaign.
Alternately, the Sunni camp could be in disarray with fingers pointing to many parts of the coalition. Was it inadequacies in Saudi air support? Bad planning on the ground? Poorly motivated troops from too many countries?
Pressure could mount for more assistance from western supporters. The Saudis may call in markers for immense arms purchases in the US. When Mohammed bin Salman writes a check for weaponry, he’s buying influence in the defense lobby and congress. The Saudis et al may press for US airstrikes, artillery, logistical help, and medical support. Such assistance, Riyadh will reason, was given to Iraqi and Kurdish troops. Why not to a longstanding ally? Naturally, US help would be only for a brief period.
A Saudi win
It’s thought that without a major port, the Houthis will no longer have sufficient revenue and supplies. Money from trade will decline but as for arms, the claim that Iran is providing large quantities is not firmly established. The Houthis draw from arsenals of the Yemeni army, large portions of which support the Houthis.
In any case, how might the war proceed if the Sunnis expel the Houthis from Hodeida? There are three possibilities: a continued slow war, negotiated autonomy for the Shia north, and subjugation of the region.
First, the Sunni states may not try to end the war swiftly with a decisive campaign for the capital Sanaa. This may be because of heavy casualties after Hodeida and concern that taking Sanaa would be even more costly. A go-slow approach might also be undertaken to force continued costs on Iran, which is already draining its coffers in the Syrian war, efforts to increase influence in Iraq, and arms to the Afghan Taliban. The Sunnis, the US, and Israel want Iran to bleed abroad and continue to foment unrest at home.
Second, the Sunnis may negotiate a settlement with the Shia of northern Yemen, granting autonomy in exchange for breaking with Iran. Riyadh will make this more attractive with subsidies. This is the most pragmatic outcome. It recognizes the fundamental incompatibility between north and south which has led to parliamentary gridlock and civil wars. Saudi Arabia, however, might see an autonomous Shia region on its border as a danger in coming years.
Third, the allied powers may opt for subjugating the Shia north under a Sunni government beholden to them – a signal to Iran and Shia populations in the Gulf. The Shias will become cowed, second-class subjects, as they are in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and elsewhere. This will almost certainly lead to profound discontent and eventual if not immediate insurgency. Yemenis are the third most armed people in the world behind the US and Serbia. They will not go gently into Saudi domination.
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Riyadh’s judgment on settling the war in Yemen is unlikely to coincide with that of neutral outsiders. The House of Saud’s judgment is shaped by religious passions and fears, and by the monarchy’s vision of regional supremacy and dynastic destiny. Americans should bear this in mind as they are guided deeper into the Sunni-Shia war.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.