Brian M Downing
Tensions over the Ukraine have brought firm responses from the United States and NATO in the form of troop deployments into Eastern Europe and threats of sanctions. Turkey is nominally in NATO but has opted to triangulate between Russia and the US. A Russian invasion of the eastern Ukraine might cause Ankara to rethink its relations toward Moscow, at least for a while until Putin’s future actions can be determined or altered.
War and triangulation
Russia and Turkey have been at odds since the days of Romanov tsars and Ottoman portes. (Paradoxically, Kievan Russia benefited from trade with the Ottomans, until the Mongols razed Kiev in the 13th century.)
Numerous wars were fought, the best known being the Crimean War (1853-56) and the First World War (1914-18). Had Russia stayed with Britain and France until Germany’s collapse in 1918, it would have been awarded Constantinople and the Dardanelles – remarkable prizes for a country obsessed with getting a warm-water port. However, the Bolsheviks left the war in March of 1918 and Britain and France carved up the Ottoman Empire between themselves.
Turkey remained neutral in the Second World War but joined NATO after it as Moscow’s expansion into Eastern Europe raised old geopolitical concerns. Hostility to Moscow and communism made Turkey a staunch Western ally. It even sent troops halfway around the world to fight in the Korean War.
In 2015, amid the Syrian civil war, Turkey shot down a Russian jet. Another conflict loomed. To the surprise of many and the dismay of NATO, both Putin and Erdogan recognized opportunity and stepped back. Putin wanted to weaken Turkey’s position in NATO and get new energy exports as well. Erdogan was eager to position himself between Russia and the West, thereby gaining leverage with both. Pakistan has done the same with the US and China, and benefited quite well. The Gulf monarchies are playing off the US against Russia and China.
Erdogan has been less artful in the triangulation game. He has irked both sides, perhaps beyond what the rules allow. He has bought Russian military hardware, including the S-400 air defense system, and moved troops into parts of Syria, displacing US-backed militias. Erdogan has angered Putin by occupying northern Syria, supporting western Libya against the Russian-Arab backed east, and encouraging Azerbaijan to attack Armenian territory.
The Ukraine
Russia’s troop movements around the Ukraine worry Turkey and they will figure in the triangulation calculus. Success in the Ukraine will embolden Putin to expand his power in the Black and Mediterranean Seas and elsewhere
Turkey sells military hardware to the Ukraine, including drones which have demonstrated their lethality on armor in Libya and Azerbaijan-Armenia. More importantly, Russia’s assertiveness in the Ukraine and Middle East hearten back historical concerns of Russian wars and secret agreements aimed at controlling access to the Mediterranean.
Moscow’s control of the Bosporus is unlikely but a hulking presence in the Ukraine and Black Sea would secure lines of communication to partners in Libya, Syria, West Africa, the Sudan, and Gulf states. Russia recently consolidated ties with Kazakhstan whose Tenguiz oil flows through Turkish pipelines to the Mediterranean. Kazakhstan could elide Ankara’s transit fees by shifting to Russian export terminals on the Black Sea.
Turkey wants no Russian shadow overhead and has its own designs for influence in the Middle East. It is already competing with Saudi Arabia for regional influence and doesn’t want the kingdom to have a powerful ally to the north. Arab arms purchases from Moscow make the partnership stronger and Russia wealthier.
Erdogan must see ominous actions to his north and south and he should reconsider his already faltering triangulation policy. Moving closer to the EU, NATO, and the US may be embarrassing but Putin is on the move, and Erdogan should be as well.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.