Brian M Downing
ISIL has been driven from large tracts of land which it boasted to be a restoration of an Islamic empire – a romantic idea that inspires many in the region. The twin capitals of Mosul and Reqaa have fallen to local forces supported by American advisors and airpower. President Trump’s call to withdraw the 2,000 US troops from Syria brought considerable criticism – so much so that the idea is adrift in the vast, uncharted area between tweet and order.
Critics claim withdrawal will allow ISIL to rise up again and retake territory. They point to the withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which was followed by ISIL’s startling offensive in 2014. ISIL, critics contend, must be completely defeated before we leave Syria.
Their words are stirring but they do not reflect an adequate understanding of ISIL. The group is not a beleaguered regiment in an isolated valley that can be destroyed root and branch. Its leaders will not stand before our generals, sign instruments of surrender, then return to civilian lives.
Regional social movement
Militant bands such as ISIL and al Qaeda come into being from beliefs and aspirations of tens of millions of people in the Islamic world. From West Africa to South Asia, young people constitute over half the population. They face bleak futures and live under corrupt and inept governments.
From childhood they’ve heard the call to war and empire from clerics, pamphlets, and family members who served with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Jihad is a way out of a dreary present and also the path to honor. Tales circulate of being part of a brotherhood, witnessing heroic feats, and striking fear into wealthy princes and ministers. Dying for Islam and caliphate is both dulce et decorum.
This romantic view of war will not go away even if ISIL is “completely defeated” in Mesopotamia. New bands will rise up and work with kindred groups in the Maghreb, Sinai, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and with clandestine networks in Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia itself. ISIL narratives will point to how close they came to restored empire, how they made princes tremble, and how victory eluded the fighters this time only because of American intervention.
Resurgence in Syria and Iraq?
ISIL retains control of several small towns and villages in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Estimates of its numbers vary and are based on little hard evidence. Even if we accept the high estimates, ISIL cannot launch the sort of offensive that saw them take much of northern Iraq in 2014.
Most of the armored vehicles and supply trucks ISIL once used have been destroyed by airstrikes, ground fire, and artillery. Such equipment requires substantial maintenance in hot, sandy environs and mechanics, spare parts, and POL aren’t plentiful. Much of ISIL’s early success relied on officers from Saddam’s disbanded army who knew tactics and logistics and could parley with Sunni populations hostile to Shia rule. Most of these officers have been killed, leaving command with zealous amateurs.
ISIL retains a good deal of money from plunder and taxation but it no longer has its former income streams. It’s lost control of the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk and the populations of large cities. Money still comes in from sympathetic donors in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states.
The enemies of ISIL are better trained and equipped than in 2014. The bulk of the Iraqi army remains incapable of sustained combat but owing to western advisory teams, elite units can put up a good fight. ISIL cannot mass troops without being detected by aerial surveillance and quickly attacked from above.
Generals Dempsey and Odierno got it right when they warned the ISIL War would last many years, perhaps several generations. Our politicians are getting it wrong and that can lead to delusional expectations and misguided policies. The war can only be won by decades of fighting and high casualties which burn out the attraction of jihadi glory in young Muslims.
A useful analogy might lie in Europe’s 20th-century devastating conflicts. In 1914, all Europe was enamored with the glory of war. Youth had been steeped in military romance from the Napoleonic Wars and colonial conquests. The stories showed the path to manhood and honor. Men marched off, women and children cheered them on. Four years and millions of deaths later, war romance was no longer ablaze, and its re-ignition in 1939 led to another massive bloodletting that virtually extinguished it. The Islamic world must have its Verduns and Stalingrads before it can reach its Westphalia and Rheims.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.