Brian M Downing
The US has entered into an alliance with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and several Gulf states to weaken Iran. The project is based less on American security interests than on those of the partners. It aims to weaken Iran by imposing sanctions, supporting insurgencies, and encouraging internal opposition to the mullahs and generals.
If the project is successful, Iran will descend into the turmoil and fragmentation seen now in other parts of the world. Sunni principalities will become even more subordinate to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia will bestride the region like the proverbial colossus.
What might Saudi Arabia look like in, say, 20 years? How will a victorious Mohammad bin Salman direct his kingdom and the vassal states around him? He will be only 54 then, youthful by the standards of Saudi kings, and could remain on the throne for another 40 years.
Three possibilities will be considered: a liberalizing monarchy, a powerful regional empire, and national disintegration. The first will be addressed here.
Favorable conditions
With Iran weakened or fragmented, Saudi Arabia will not face serious external threats – a longstanding justification for internal surveillance, repression, and harsh rule throughout history. Threats from internal groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL could diminish in coming decades as young people no longer see the attraction of fighting long wars for the dream of a new caliphate.
Mohammad bin Salman is embarking on an ambitious program of using the nation’s oil wealth to build a diverse economy, complete with industrial and manufacturing sectors. The kingdom could see thriving working-, middle-, and professional-classes that have meaningful jobs and stakes in their nation’s future.
Fewer people will depend on state doles and more will pay taxes in dialog with the state. Workers, middle classes, and professionals will ask to participate in national affairs, especially through the elected bodies of today which have no real power.
The monarchy may see accession to reform as necessary. The US, Britain, France, and Israel may convince the ruler that present arrangements are not only out of date but impractical. The kingdom will no longer be a patchwork of tribal and patrimonial relations, but a modern, industrial state with a vibrant population who must be listened to, lest the crown become out of step.
Mohammad bin Salman may see opening up the political system as evidence of his vision and benevolence. Having established his nation’s security and economic future, he can add to his place in history as a great reformer and guarantor of Islam’s enduring greatness. Where Abbasids, Fatimids, and Ottomans failed, the Sauds will succeed.
Likelihood
Few foresaw the momentous changes that swept the Middle East with the world wars and the Arab Spring. The region is capable of bringing surprises. However, a shift toward liberal reforms inside the kingdom isn’t likely.
The House of Saud is guided by Wahhabi ideology that sees purity, faith, and order in the present form of government. A modicum of reform will lead to a descent into turmoil, hyper-individualism, separatism, and anarchy. The rulers can point to Iraq, Syria, and Libya as clear and nearby evidence.
A connection between modern economy and liberal government was once an article of faith in the West, though the example of China and many other developing countries suggest otherwise. Mohammad bin Salman’s industrialization program isn’t likely to foster liberal reform. It will not bring an independent and assertive bourgeoisie. New sectors will be managed by members of his family and beholden associates. The crown prince’s eye is fixed on the Chinese model, not the European one.
Victory over Iran will not bring enlightened benevolence and liberalization. It’s likely to legitimize and strengthen Mohammad bin Salman’s iron fist. Furthermore, it will magnify his ambitions to eradicate dissidence at home and expand his power abroad.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.