Brian M Downing
The US has been aligned with Saudi Arabia since the 1940s when Washington determined it had expended too much domestic oil in World War Two. Saudi oil was coming on line and deemed an attractive alternative to further depletion of tracts at home. Ties continued for several decades as America consumed more oil but produced less.
Today, with the US producing more oil than Saudi Arabia, the relationship is based on Saudi arms purchases. Money and oil flow, but where is the kingdom headed? Part one looked at the possibility that in coming decades Mohammad bin Salman will enact substantive liberal reforms in his kingdom – a prospect judged unlikely here. The more likely possibility that Saudi Arabia will descend into turmoil and disintegration, as with many countries today in and out of the Middle East, will be considered.
Conditions
The Saudi state relies on oil revenue to placate its subjects and extend its power in the world. Prices are trending downward as alternative energies become available and US oil production soars. Prices may continue to disappoint Riyadh. Its subjects may object to tighter domestic spending. All the more so as the royal family expends large sums on Egypt, Pakistan, and Lebanon, buys pricey weaponry from abroad, and lives in luxury.
The conflict with Iran may drag on without sign of progress. Money is squandered, princes boast of their judicious guidance. Arms purchases may be seen as earmarked at least as much for internal dissidents as for Iranian soldiers.
Mohammad bin Salman’s sweeping industrialization program may not work out. Factories may pour out goods that cannot compete in world markets. Average Saudis may not have meaningful jobs and good wages as hoped, and view the managerial class as inept members of the royal family and its retinue.
Fissures
The kingdom’s population is about 10-15% Shia, concentrated in the southwest and oil-rich east. They are treated like second-rate subjects and persecuted for collaboration with Iran, though little evidence is offered.
Reformists want to see the monarchy yield to representative government. They point to Jordan and Tunisia as promising young democracies and also to Egypt where the Saudi rulers helped quash democracy.
Traditionalists are wary of Mohammad bin Salman. Allowing women to sit on city councils and drive cars violates Wahabbi strictures. Industrialization will bring directionless change and rampant immorality, as it did in the West. And cooperating with the US and Israel betrays the faith and the Palestinians as well. ISIL and al Qaeda may find more support in coming years.
The House of Saud keeps its doors closed and curtains drawn. Inside the royal family, however, are hundreds of princes and princesses who oppose Mohammad bin Salman’s accession to the throne and many of his policies too. They may favor liberal reforms or at least call for them as a way to weaken him.
Fissures may be deepened by outside forces. Even a greatly weakened Iran may encourage uprisings in Shia regions. Qatar and Turkey are wary of Saudi power and may welcome an opportunity to weaken it. Much of the Arab world loathes Saudi Arabia and blames it for suppressing the Arab Spring, meddling in their nations’ internal affairs, abandoning the Palestinians, and promoting a reactionary form of Islam.
The view here is that the Saudi partnership with Israel isn’t viable in the long run and that tensions will mount over Saudi influence in Egypt, Lebanon, and perhaps one day in Syria as Riyadh offers reconstruction aid and tries to weaken ties with Tehran. The danger is so apparent that a skillful actor in regional politics is almost certain to be prepared to weaken the kingdom, probably by orchestrating destabilizing potentials noted here.
Implications for the US
Serious internal trouble for Saudi Arabia may be looming. It could disintegrate along Shia/Sunni and reformist/traditionalist lines or even face general lawlessness as in parts of Libya and Syria. Saudi Arabia spends lavishly on instruments of internal repression, but so did the shah and Mubarak before they were driven out.
The rulers may call for help from abroad to hold the country together and keep them in power. The kingdom retains Pakistani veterans in its security forces and even several thousand Pakistani combat troops, but it’s unclear where their sympathies and interests would lie amid a violent popular upheaval far from home.
The House of Saud might call upon its chief arms provider for help. No prince, no bucks. Even the most obliging administration, however, would hesitate to send troops into a widespread upheaval against so unpopular a regime. The Pentagon may be no less reluctant.
The Saudi princes were angered by Putin’s intervention in Syria. Russian aircraft pummeled rebel positions and civilian districts and even countenanced the use of chemical weapons. The princes of Riyadh were thwarted in their effort to depose Assad but the pitiless Russian methods must have attracted their attention for future possibilities at home. And Putin or an equally ambitious and brutal successor will welcome the opportunity to gain power in the Gulf at the US’s expense.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.