Brian M Downing
Speculation about Russia resorting to nuclear weapons has gone on since the invasion stalled and embarrassing setbacks followed. No definite answer can be given. Putin himself might not know for sure yet. It doesn’t seem implausible.
Mutually assured destruction kept nuclear weapons in the silos during the Cold War. MAD doesn’t hold here as Ukraine relinquished its nuclear weapons in exchange, paradoxically, for Moscow’s recognition of its independence. And the West isn’t likely to retaliate after a Russian first use. Putin knows this.
The conduct of the war shows complete disregard for international norms. Civilians are systematically targeted, perpetrators of war crimes are decorated, children are deported for reeducation, and troops are allowed to rape and pillage. The destruction of the Dnipro dam demonstrates willingness to inflict widespread destruction. The distinction between blowing a dam and using nuclear weapons might not be as large in Putin’s mind as it is in ours.
Putin’s standing
It’s well known that Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a geopolitical disaster. His climb to power and actions in office have sought to avenge lost honor, restore empire, and place himself in the nation’s pantheon alongside Ivan, Peter, and Stalin. They earned their positions through war and victory – pillars of greatness since the days of Alexander. Victory in Ukraine is elusive to say the least. Putin’s offensives have failed, casualties are high, generals come and go. Instead of becoming revered as Vladimir the Great, he may be scorned as Vladimir the Unready.
Putin rallied the nation by tapping into vibrant WW2 memories. It’s his only success but he must deliver victory or face eroding confidence. After all, Nicholas II’s popularity climbed at the outset of the First World War. Without signs of progress, Putin will face the same disaffection that undermined Nicholas and Kerensky. A severe blow in the land bridge and the Crimea could hasten discontent in the public, army, and state. Discontent might coalesce into meaningful opposition.
Putin also knows failure could bring disenchantment in his sole major ally – China. Beijing supports Russia through increased oil purchases and technology transfers but it might one day press hard for a negotiated settlement or even orchestrate his ouster. Putin has another problem to his east that requires a show of power. He knows China is a rising power eager to right wrongs dating back centuries, including Romanov annexations of Chinese territories.
Putin’s aims
Last year US intelligence claimed that Putin’s generals would block any order to use nuclear weapons and may have removed his authority over them. However, the specter of defeat and fear of Putin’s wrath may have changed things. In the estimation of Putin and his generals, using one or more nuclear weapons, if only somewhere over the Black Sea, would deliver major strategic benefits.
Ukraine, NATO, and the world would no longer see Putin as a faltering ruler at the head of an ineffectual army. Russia will be recognized as a determined power willing to use every weapon at its disposal.
NATO would be alarmed and deeply divided over retaliatory options. In some capitals further support to Ukraine might be reconsidered or even curtailed.
Russia would be positioned to negotiate a settlement that would include reducing military aid to Ukraine and ceding Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and the land bridge.
The Russian public, army and state would cheer the bold action that changed the fortunes of war. Putin’s standing would climb, his claim to a position in the pantheon would be strengthened. Vladimir the Terrible may sound appealing inside Russia.
China could refrain from openly supporting the use of nuclear weapons and plausibly deny any prior knowledge. It would lament the dangers of war and call for greater dialog in settling conflicts around the world. China would greet the prospect of fracturing the West. Putin’s iron will would demonstrate that a new world order directed by Beijing is at hand.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.