Winning and losing in Syria

Brian M Downing

The US is pulling out of Syria. Damascus, backed by Moscow, welcomed the vacuum and moved troops into Kurdish areas to counter the Turkish incursion. The view here has long been that the US presence in eastern Syria was poorly thought out and bound to end badly. 

American politicians are criticizing Trump’s decision. They claim he betrayed our Kurdish allies and handed Russia an easy win. They point to images of Russian troops sauntering through abandoned US camps. Americans felt a sense of satisfaction on seeing Russian troops withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988 and when US-backed troops took Kabul in 2001. In a few years the appearance of a Russian victory in Syria may change. 

Gains

Russia has had considerable influence in Syria since the sixties. It armed and trained the Syrian military and those of Egypt and Iraq as well. However, the latter two states have broken with Moscow, leaving Syria its only firm ally west of Iran.

Moscow demonstrated firm commitment to Assad during the civil war. Its aircraft devastated rebel positions and civilian neighborhoods alike. Although the Sunni powers backed rebel groups and wanted to oust the Shia/Alawi regime, they also took note of the brutal effectiveness of Russian airpower. Such methods may be needed in the kingdom and Emirates one day. The princes know the US will not defend them so ruthlessly. Russia will be more obliging as it would expand Moscow’s power and weaken Washington’s. The Sunnis may keep channels open.

With Turkish and Syrian forces at daggers drawn, Russia is positioned to intervene diplomatically. Assad and Erdogan must know that a protracted war would gravely weaken both of them and possibly bring their governments down. Moscow may be able to cool things down, win international plaudits, and burnish its image.

Hazards

The Syrian-Turkish conflict has dealt a blow to Russia’s ambitions in Turkey. Putin wanted to detach Turkey from NATO and weaken the US. The dynamics haven’t played out yet, but the conflict might limit Ankara’s defiance of the US.

Syria is firmly in the Russian sphere but that constitutes a problem. The country is in ruins and will need large subsidies for years to come. Despite shows of opulence, Russia is not a wealthy country. Much of Syria’s population is Sunni and more hostile to the Shia/Alawi regime than ever. Assad has bombed them, tortured them, used chemical weapons on them, and conducted ethnic cleansing in the western area. 

Syrian troops are coming to the defense of Kurdish territory which of course Damascus sees as integral parts of Syria. The Kurds, however, have enjoyed a measure of autonomy since government troops withdrew to western Syria in 2012. Assad offered them autonomy in exchange for not siding with the rebels. The presence of government troops and the implication of reduced autonomy, if not its compete abrogation, is a problem that will need to be addressed in coming years. Russia may find itself as a clumsy arbiter and foreign occupier.

Groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL have clandestine support in Sunni Syria and just across the border in Sunni Iraq. Money and recruits will flow in from nearby Sunni states. ISIL et al may devote more attention to Russian targets than to American ones.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.