Longterm strategic thinking and the Middle East, part one

Brian M Downing 

In recent years American policies in the Middle East have met with mixed success. Key allies are reasonably secure and arms sales are on the rise. However, intermittent efforts to liberalize the region have brought more chaos than democracy, in large part because most Arab rulers oppose representative government. 

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to sectarian warfare, corrupt and inept governments, al Qaeda and ISIL havens, and the deaths of 4500 GIs – so far. The effort in Syria is moving to an end as an embarrassing if predictable abandonment of the Kurds. 

The military is disenchanted with interminable wars in the region. Special forces, pilots, and ground crews are weary of continuous deployments. Even the generals are realizing it now. President Trump calls for pulling back but sends troops into Saudi Arabia to confront Iran.

There are tens of thousands of US troops in the Middle East. There are permanent bases in Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Troops sent back into Saudi Arabia may be there awhile. A carrier group is ever present in the Persian Gulf, another one is often just outside it. How did this come about? Looking ahead to the middle of the century, how important will the region be to the world?

Oil and gas

Strategic thinkers judged the country had expended too much oil wealth in the world war. Though the US was still an energy exporter, it was determined that resources had to be conserved for another war and that world demand should be met with Middle Eastern oil. The transition was made all the more attractive due to western businesses’ domination in Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

Franklin Roosevelt and Abdul Aziz ibn Saud agreed that the US would defend the kingdom in exchange for oil. Military bases sprang up, more followed when Britain reduced its presence east of Aden. 

The region’s oil and gas are becoming less important every year. The US is now the world’s largest producer, exports are on the rise, and self-sufficiency may be at hand in a decade. Kazakhstan, Brazil, the eastern Mediterranean, and a slew of smaller areas are ramping up energy production with the benefit of new technology. Importing nations may see instability and harsh rule in the Gulf and choose to buy elsewhere.

Automobiles are more efficient than twenty years ago and the process is continuing. Further, a shift away from fossil is underway as solar and wind power becomes more competitive. 

The Cold War and Cold War Two

The US and the Soviet Union once vied for power throughout the world. The Middle East was one of the more important theaters. Moscow once aligned closely with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The Soviet Union of course collapsed in 1991 and today Russia is closely tied to only Syria – more a liability than an asset at this point. Iran has moved into Moscow’s sphere, in part because of Washington’s interference and support for the shah.

Cold War Two is well underway and the Middle East is once again an arena. Russia, nor aligned closely with China, is positioning itself to gain influence at Washington’s expense. Recent events in Syria have caused many to decry Moscow’s adroitness and Washington’s clumsiness. Few would contradict those views but a broader perspective might offer the view that the region’s importance will decline in coming decades as the importance of oil declines and regional instability (to be addressed in part two here) worsens. Many countries will be no more an asset than Syria is.  

Israel 

Britain and France, concerned over oil imports, reduced their support for Israel following the Six-Day War (1967). The US, owing to domestic support and the Cold War, became Israel’s chief ally and arms supplier. Support was especially needed in the Yom Kippur War (1973) when the US rushed in antitank missiles and helped defeat Egyptian air defenses. 

The strategic situation is different now. Egypt and Jordan have inked peace treaties with Israel. Syria and Libya are shattered and will remain deeply divided along sectarian and regional lines for decades. Iraq too is shattered and its government is uninterested in Israel. Iran has gone from Israel’s ally to an enemy. However, Israel has positioned itself alongside Sunni powers against Iran, providing security along its periphery.

Russia once backed Egypt, Syria, and Iraq against Israel but now has cordial relations with it. Israel buys oil from Russia and sells it technology. Soon, Russian oil will flow through Israel to Eilat on the Red Sea from which it will reach markets in Africa and Asia. 

Counterterrorism 

Since 9/11 the US has trained and helped several countries in surveillance, intelligence gathering, and neutralizing individual terrorists and al Qaeda and ISIL networks. The US government and private sector work hand in hand. Iraq is a case in point. A few years after Baghdad ordered US  troops out, al Qaeda networks reappeared and assassinated several leaders of the Sunni Awakening. Baghdad asked for, and received, counterterrorism teams from the US. The al Qaeda networks evolved into ISIL a few years later.

The region is rife with popular discontent with ruling cliques, sectarian favoritism, overpopulation, and lack of opportunity. Some of the discontent leads to calls for reform, some fuels terrorism. Discontent will not be eliminated by moderate political reform or greater government largesse. 

Nor will American counterterrorism efforts end discontent. Further, regimes use foreign intelligence help to identify leaders of legitimate reform movements, making US teams merge with state repression. The US presence, then, will be endless, thankless, and fruitless – save for providing recruitment propaganda for militants. 

Part Two: Reasons to leave the Middle East

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.