Brian M Downing
American security interests in the Middle East are declining, yet US troop levels there are rising. By mid-century the region will not be as important to world energy supplies or rivalries with Russia and China. Israel faces no coherent enemies. The Arab world will be plagued by internal problems and sectarian warfare for a generation and Israel has adroitly aligned itself with Russia. Without Moscow’s support Arab armies would fare even worse than they did in ’67 and ‘73.
Containing terrorism will remain important. Indeed jihadism will continue to worsen and strike foreign personnel in the region – American or Russian or Chinese. There are compelling advantages to reducing our presence and saddling rivals with a deteriorating situation.
The debt burden
The national debt today stands at $23 trillion and is expected to reach $33 trillion in ten years. The numbers are staggering and unfathomable. Politicians have been long promising that economic growth will lower the debt but it hasn’t happened yet, and never will.
In ten years, payments on the debt alone will near $1 trillion per year. That’s roughly the cost of the entire Vietnam War in today’s dollars. Hard budgetary decisions will have to be made. Pulling back from commitments around the world may be necessary and the Middle East will be a compelling place to begin.
A new majority is coalescing that will reassess global priorities. The debt crisis may be the catalyst for change. Entitlements, they hold, are basic human rights, no different than free speech and religion. Their interest in the world is more attuned to human rights and climate change than national security. They doubt the usefulness and desirability of military bases up and down the Persian Gulf and counterterrorism teams deployed to an unknown number of places.
Better to reduce spending in a region of diminishing importance and nonexistent political-cultural affinities.
The instability burden
The Arab Spring jarred the region eight years ago and a second one is underway in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq. The underlying issues are a large youth population, limited employment opportunities, and autocratic governance. These problems will persist for decades and bring on periodic upheavals. Some regimes may collapse, unless a powerful foreign ally steps in – perhaps as forcefully as Russia did in Syria.
Future conflict will take place as oil becomes less important. Wind and solar power are making remarkable strides and younger people are increasingly concerned with the effect of hydrocarbons on the climate.
Saudi Arabia is embarking on an ambitious industrialization program that aims to modernize the kingdom and its Sunni allies. The process will offend those whose expectations have been dashed and traditionalists who fear a lurch toward the decadence of the West. Failure will mean greater turmoil.
Middle Eastern regimes, especially the one in Riyadh, are going to face persistent and growing opposition from several quarters. Some opponents will press for liberal reforms, others such as the Muslim Brotherhood will demand their brand of Islamism. ISIL and al Qaeda, already ensconced in the region, will grow in popularity and lethality. They will target the regime, security forces, and foreign troops and civilians.
The view here is that Russia and China are already gaining power in the Middle East at the US’s expense. China buys vast amounts of oil, the US hardly any. Moscow collaborates with Riyadh on oil production, American producers race to produce as much as possible and grab market share. Kings and emirs know that they will face dangerous upheavals and that Russia can be relied upon to help them as ruthlessly as it did Assad in Syria.
Russia and China are already accessing the lucrative arms sales in the region – a market presently dominated by the US, UK, and France. The transition is bound to continue. Western powers will face exports and higher unemployment. However, along with those exports comes pressure to defend authoritarian rulers and come to their aid. We’ve seen the US intervene in Yemen and Syria and position itself to attack Iran – conflicts tied to arms sales, not American security.
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The rise of Russia and China in the Middle East may be deemed a strategic defeat and sign of America’s decline. If Washington properly assesses the region’s future, and facilitates the transition of power, it will prove to be adroit geopolitical judo.
The US can maintain a limited presence outside the Strait of Hormuz in Oman and Diego Garcia. From there it can look on as the region is wracked by stagnant economies, popular upheavals, apocalyptic terrorists, sectarian hatreds, scheming dynasts, and increasingly rickety and murderous monarchies – and as Russia and China struggle to hold things together.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.