Brian M Downing
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi hoped to conquer and lead a new Islamist empire. His armies once alarmed capitals in and out of the region. However, western-backed forces ground them down and late last week American special forces killed him. What does his death mean for the future of ISIL and more generally for Islamist militancy?
Leadership qualities
Baghdadi was not an inspirational speaker, even by the standards of the region. His speeches were few in number and dull, dour, and pedantic. His appeal rested on dazzling military victory. His forces sent most enemies, especially the Iraqi army, into panicked flight and carved out large tracts of land in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Baghdadi proclaimed that he’d erased Sykes-Picot,
ISIL’s military success did not stem from Baghdadi’s tactical, strategic, or logistical skills. His field commanders were former colonels in Saddam Hussein’s army which was disbanded by the US in 2003, providing a recruitment boon for insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIL’s precursor. (Baghdadi’s successor is a former Iraqi officer.)
Even more important was the remarkable cohesion in ISIL units, which persists to this day. Despite high casualties, relentless airstrikes, and a string of defeats, they’ve fought on. Cohesion is based on the soldiers’ Salafi faith which forms fraternal bonds and common goals. ISIL ground forces are the most competent army the region has produced in decades.
Osama bin Laden was able to raise funds from wealthy donors in the Gulf states. Baghdadi probably had some success too but ISIL’s revenue was based more on harsh taxation of fearful populaces and the smuggling of crude oil and historical artifacts.
Its territory gone and a transition to underground insurgency underway, ISIL may find support from Sunni states as the conflict with Iran and its Shia allies continues. Sunni powers support ISIL in the hope of channeling its energies away from them and toward Shia governments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Limited evidence shows the Sunni powers have long been aiding AQ and ISIL.
ISIL and al Qaeda
Baghdadi’s presence in AQ territory near Idlib gives rise to suspicion that ISIL and AQ may be merging or at least cooperating. Not unlikely at all as ISIL was once the AQ operation in Iraq until its offensive into Syria angered the local AQ outfit (al Nusrah Front) and AQ leadership in Pakistan.
Merger will not reconstitute AQ/ISIL into the fearsome mechanized-infantry force the latter was in 2014. Its success in Syria was based on the chaos of the civil war. That conflict, however, is all but over and Syrian and Russian forces are in power. Western Iraq is less settled but Iraqi special forces and American airpower are at the ready for now.
AQ/ISIL might be able to hold small redoubts here and there but it’s better suited to guerrilla fighting relying on indigenous Sunni hostility to Damascus and Baghdad – and on foreign backing. Outside the region, they will be part of a league of similar groups stretching from the Maghreb to Central Asia where governments are weak and grievances strong.
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ISIL isn’t going away. It will continue to draw recruits and money from the large population of young men in the Islamic world who despise their rulers, resent the lack of opportunity, and revere the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology of heroic war. Those conditions will not end with the deaths of bin Laden and Baghdadi. They are a structural problem that will last generations.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.