Brian M Downing
Relations between Israel and Russia have shifted, even reversed, more than once since the former’s inception in 1948. This isn’t surprising given the region’s volatility and Moscow’s power vicissitudes. The Soviet Union, in keeping with its policy of weakening Western powers, supported Jewish settlers in the 1948 war against Arab countries. A few years later though, Moscow supported Israel’s enemies.
Today, Russia and Israel are aligned – more or less. Moscow’s approach to Israel is based on opportunism, trade, and a larger strategic vision for the Middle East. Another shift could come in a decade or two.
The Soviet Union and Israel
After Israel became a state, Moscow continued its anti-colonial policy by supporting likeminded independence movements and secular populists. There was no shortage of them. Moscow could not gather Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, North Yemen, and Iraq into its sphere without breaking with Israel. Numbers and wealth made the decision easy.
The alignment strengthened when Israel, Britain, and France attacked Egypt in 1956. The Sinai War sought to humiliate Nasser, bring his downfall, and regain colonial control of the Suez Canal. It failed on all three counts after the US demanded withdrawal.
For decades Moscow sold immense amounts of arms to Israel’s Arab enemies. This helped the poorly-run Soviet economy and provided an incentive to continue the anti-Israel stance. Russian advisers trained Arab armies, supported border attacks, and guided intermittent escalations.
When in 1967 Egypt closed Israel’s access to the Red Sea and threatened war, Israel struck first and destroyed the Egyptian and Syrian armies in short order. Moscow rebuilt Arab armies, supported terrorist groups, encouraged the war of attrition along the Canal, and helped plan a war to regain lost honor. Arab forces fared better in the ’73 war at first but eventually suffered another devastating defeat.
Russia and Israel
The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 eventually brought better ties between Moscow and Jerusalem. Many Israelis, despite Russia’s long history of violent antisemitism, respect Russia for grinding down the Third Reich and liberating the death camps in the east.
Trade has prospered. Iranian crude once entered Eilat on the Red Sea and flowed up through a pipeline to Ashkelon. Now Russian oil comes into Ashkelon, flows down the same pipeline, and eventually reaches Africa and Asia. Russia purchases Israeli hi-tech, especially specialized military devices including drones.
Israel also gains strategically. Traditional enemies today pose no danger. Egypt and Jordan have inked peace agreements with Israel. Libya, Syria, and Iraq are in ruins and deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Furthermore, they can never pose a threat without powerful foreign backing. Arab armies performed badly with Russian support. Without it, they dare not antagonize Israel.
Another shift coming?
Over the years Russian-Israeli ties have rested on specific conditions and those conditions may be changing. Russia has aided Syria reconquer much of the land once held by various rebel groups. Along the way it has built up a large airbase on the Mediterranean which, along with the Tartus naval base, gives it a considerable military presence. Israel would prefer Syria remain fragmented and detached from major allies.
Moscow and Turkey are cooperating in establishing buffers separating and weakening Kurdish populations. Israel has long supported the Kurds and wants them to be an independent force beholden to it.
Russia and China want to replace the US as the dominant outside power in the region. The process is underway. Once adamant foes of Moscow for its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and longstanding enmity toward religion, the Sunnis are buying Russian arms and cooperating on oil quotas. China will secure oil resources and Russia will gain arms sales for its flagging economy. Both will benefit from weakening the US.
In coming decades, with Sunni petrodollars pouring in, Russia may become as receptive to Sunni foreign policy objectives as the US is now, if not more so. The Sunnis harbor longstanding hostility toward Israel. They have borne the humiliation of repeated defeats and seethed as the Palestinians lost land and the promise of their own state.
Numbers and wealth might convince Moscow that the Sunnis powers are more important than Israel. What are Israeli hi-tech and oil imports compared to immense arms purchases, hegemony in the Gulf, and a US retreat?
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.