Brian M Downing
Israel is more secure now than at any time since its founding. Regional enemies have either signed peace agreements (Egypt, Jordan), all but disintegrated from internal divisions (Syria, Libya, Iraq), or aligned with it against Iran (Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Jerusalem has skillfully built ties with Moscow. Without its backing, no regional power can risk war with Israel.
Israeli security bureaus are unlikely to share this assessment, but such institutions, in any country, are predisposed to dire scenarios. Strategists would do well to consider a more longterm scenario of Saudi Arabia and Russia turning against Israel. They might reconsider current arrangements with those two traditional enemies.
The threat
A coming danger from Saudi Arabia and Russia has been presented here in previous articles. It can be summarized.
Saudi Arabia has historically been hostile to Israel. It funded Arab armies and Palestinian terrorists. It’s a wellhead of deep antisemitic beliefs which have spread throughout the region. Riyadh has used its petrodollars to garner popular support from the Maghreb to South Asia. Several armies rely on its subsidies.
Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince has clearly demonstrated his ruthlessness and ambition. He may one day turn on Israel to enhance his prestige and avenge the Arab world for a string of humiliations since 1948. Only thirty-three, he may be on the throne until 2080, unless he is deposed or assassinated.
Russia sells oil to Israel and buys hi-tech from it. However, Russia has much larger objectives in the Middle East. It seeks, in conjunction with China, to expel the US from the Persian Gulf and become the region’s main supplier of military equipment. This would be a boon to the Russian economy and national prestige. Russia has far more to gain from cooperating with a dozen Arab states than a single Jewish one.
Saudi Arabia and Russia could one day see advantages to joining forces. Russia would replace the US in the Gulf and align with revanchist Arab states against Israel. Today’s surface cordiality may become a brief pause in a long Russian-Arab alignment against Israel and we may see a return to the status quo ante pacem.
Preventive countermeasures
A Saudi-Russian threat could be limited by Israel’s military power, which includes nuclear weapons, and also by American might. However, the US will face severe fiscal constraints by mid-century and public pressure will mount to reduce the American footprint around the world. The Persian Gulf will be a tempting place to step back from. The region’s oil will be of no importance and political-cultural affinities are negligible.
American support for Israel will not diminish. A confrontation between a Saudi-Russian bloc and the US and Israel would likely be a costly standoff. It could be prevented by policies today.
Riyadh’s effort to expand its regional influence and command a league of Sunni states, some with large and competent armies, should be countered. Saudi influence is on the rise but so is nationalist and ethnic hostility to the kingdom. The Houthis of North Yemen are the most powerful such group. Many Egyptians blame Riyadh for the extinction of democracy in 2013 and were outraged by a proposed sale of Red Sea islands. Elsewhere the Saudis are seen as sybaritic meddlers. This sentiment can be encouraged and mobilized at auspicious moments.
Many groups inside the kingdom oppose the monarchy and especially Mohammad bin Salman. These groups include liberal reformers, traditionalist tribes, followers of the Muslim Brotherhood, Shia people, and radical jihadis. So pervasive are these groups that they could one day cooperate, if only briefly, to paralyze the kingdom and perhaps fragment it.
Some rulers in the region are wary of Saudi power and may become regional balancers. Oman stays clear of Saudi schemes. Qatar resents a failed coup directed by Riyadh and is presently enduring an embargo from the same place. The Emiratis are generally aligned with the Saudi prince but oppose his fixation on dominating all Yemen.
Iran is the most powerful potential balancing state – and of course the one most hostile to Israel and the US. However, Iran was once close to the US and even closer to Israel. Iranian threats prevented Iraq and Saudi Arabia from using military assets against Israel in the ’67 and ’73 wars. Israel helped Iran in the long war against Iraq in the 1980s.
Iran isn’t going to realign with the US and Israel in the near future. Decades of Neoconservative and Likud policies have brought deep hostility. But foreign policy should not be guided by short-term considerations.
The Tehran delenda est policy of today, if successful, would empower Saudi Arabia, embolden its monarchy, and bring adverse consequences for Israel and the US. Today, the policy seems merely wrongheaded. In a few decades it might be judged a catastrophic blunder.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.