Baghdad looks to ease the Gulf’s sectarian conflict 

Brian M Downing 

Iraq gravely worsened Sunni-Shia animosities by invading Iran in 1980. Though unsupportive at first, the Sunni states funneled support to Saddam Hussein to stave off defeat and a triumphant Shia republic. The war lasted eight years and killed hundreds of thousands. Today, Iraq is trying to use diplomacy to cool things. Fighting continues in Syria and Yemen. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for the upper hand inside Iraq. 

What support can Baghdad look for? How vigorously will Washington, Riyadh, and Jerusalem oppose diplomacy? What benefits might follow? And what problems might follow from US intransigence?

Diplomatic help for Baghdad 

It’s clear that another major war in the Gulf would be a disaster. Nonetheless, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel support bombings and assassinations inside Iran in the hope of gravely weakening the government. Despite years of pressure, the mullahs and generals remain strong but the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel press on.

Baghdad has tried to steer a neutral path between Riyadh and Tehran, though the two rivals are deeply involved with political parties and armed militias that are destabilizing Iraq. 

Baghdad will have considerable help from abroad, both inside the region and elsewhere. Oman and Qatar have judiciously avoided the conflict and do not want the sectarian rivals to damage commerce. The EU sees a more tranquil region as a boon for exports and investments. Asian oil importers don’t want to see shortages, price hikes, and a return to the tanker war of the 80s. Foremost is China which sees a potential war as delaying the March to restored greatness. It wants to secure oil supplies, increase its standing in the world, and bring the US down a rung. 

Goals and benefits 

Successful diplomacy will not usher in a new day. Tensions will remain, as they did during US dominance in the Twin Pillar era, but open warfare will be far less likely. Diplomacy can, however, provide a more promising political and economic environment.

Success will entail Saudi and Iranian pullbacks from meddling inside Iraq. Baghdad will press hard for this as negotiations begin. Indeed, the issue is a driving force in the diplomatic effort. Rival militias will be weakened, parliamentary coalitions less fragmentary, and a frail democracy strengthened, at least somewhat. Tensions mean instability, peace offers the prospect of stability.

Regional stability will make for a more hospitable investment environment and greater growth for vast, restive youth cohorts. Governments will be better able, and perhaps more inclined, to improve social conditions. Human rights might fare better as anger over external meddling diminishes. Attention can turn to terminating pointless wars and sanctions in Syria and Yemen, which should be central to early discussions. Assad has prevailed, the Houthis have as well.

Opposition

The US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have been committed to weakening Iran for many years. Little has been achieved, nothing more is achievable. Riyadh and Jerusalem remain adamant. Biden wants to alter the policy but has thus far shown no willingness to risk losing immense Saudi investment or facing domestic reaction. Overly-solicitous to overly-demanding Middle Eastern allies, the US is becoming inflexible and unadaptive to emerging realities.

Staying the course in the Gulf will go against Biden’s stated emphasis on diplomacy. It will also weaken US standing in the world and open the door to China at a most inopportune time. Beijing can step in with support for Iraq, Qatar, Oman, and the EU. Whether the effort is successful or not, China will benefit. 

Alongside international diplomacy, China is working with Iran to get the US out of Iraq and Syria. Iran has considerable influence with many Iraqi parties, movements, and militias. Having been awarded prized oil tracts and engineering projects since the US ousted Saddam Hussein, China has developed influence as well. Iran and China will try to build a voting bloc that will order the US to withdraw, as in 2008. US forces in eastern Syria would be isolated and may have to leave as well. 

Leaving Iraq and Syria are good ideas, but it would be better for the departure to be our idea, not one from a government we created and one eager to weaken and replace us. US support for diplomacy will make for a more graceful exit.

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.