Rivalry and diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, part three: victory and its discontents

Brian M Downing

Rewards

Hegemony in the Gulf, should China achieve it one day, would be an important step forward in the march to power. It would secure sources of oil and gas, which though of lessening importance to the US and EU, remain critical to China’s booming economy. The US would be less well positioned to interdict Chinese tankers and Beijing would be able to influence production quotas, especially in conjunction with Russia, a major exporter too. 

China could also influence exports to rival powers such as India, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. In a crunch, PLA warships could interdict their supplies and exact a price for their release. All East and South Asia and much of the rest of the world would have to be more respectful of Beijing’s views. 

Supplanting the US inside the Gulf, through diplomatic maneuver rather than military engagement, would be deeply embarrassing to the US – and highly concerning to its allies. Clearly, a new era will have dawned and states around the world would have to realize the ramifications. Better to get on board with the future than founder with the past

The Gulf countries are major purchasers of weapons. That began following the OPEC price hikes of the early seventies, which brought balance of payment woes to the US and other western industrial states. President Nixon convinced the Gulf states to build up their militaries – naturally with US hardware. Arms and trainers went in, oil and gas came out. 

China and Russia have made inroads on the arms bonanza but want to dominate it, strengthening their industries and weakening America’s. New training missions will be needed, giving the PLA a foothold in the region, possibly followed by bases and airfields – or hoisting their flags over abandoned ones. China’s power prestige would soar as its public and those around the world see PLA warships and planes control the Gulf and the waters around it. 

Dangers 

China, as noted previously, can position itself to calm sectarian hatreds. However, those passions go back fourteen centuries and have erupted periodically ever since. China will face a daunting challenge as its century unfolds. It may find support from Qatar and Oman, two Gulf states that steer neutral courses between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but troubles are bound to recur – and of course they can be encouraged from foreign capitals. 

Another challenge will be holding up faltering monarchs as they face uprisings and insurgent groups. China, and junior partner Russia, have considerable experience in holding up authoritarian governments with the proper allegiances – Syria, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, North Korea. In the Syrian case, Russia used heavy airstrikes and looked the other was as Assad used chemical weapons on his people. Much of the world was horrified but the Gulf monarchs likely saw a determined potential ally, one that would support them come what may. 

America’s presence in the Middle East has caused resentments, burdens, and terrorist attacks. China’s ascendance will do the same. Liberal reformers, the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and ISIL will oppose the presence of Chinese engineers, merchants, military personnel, and internal security forces. Beijing’s harsh treatment of its own Muslims will amplify resentments and attacks in the Middle East and perhaps lead to cooperation throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.   

ISIL and AQ may shift from western targets and ply their lethal trade against the new masters of the Gulf. Machiavellian states outside the co-prosperity may enjoy or even support the shift. 

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.