Rivalry and diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, part two: China seeks hegemony

Brian M Downing

In coming years the US and China will be vying for power throughout the world. This will be especially so in the Persian Gulf owing to its strategic and symbolic importance. Diplomacy in Yemen may lead the way to bolder efforts. China cannot allow the US to control the flow of its oil and Chinese ships. What greater sign of China’s ascendance than seeing US flags taken down inside the Gulf?

Beijing will try to convince regional states that the US can no longer perform as it once did and that China should be the new hegemon. After all, China is confident and growing, in need of oil and gas, and supportive of authoritarian rulers. Beijing has several arguments and levers.

War and national interests 

An all-out war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is unlikely. However, the low-level attacks by the Saudi-backed MEK inside Iran and the same by Iran-backed Houthis inside the kingdom could get out of hand. A war would jack global oil prices, interrupt shipments, and delay China’s march to the top.

Beijing will point out to the Sunni princes that their hopes of directing US military power onto Iran isn’t working and never will.  The most hawkish presidents in recent years, Reagan, Bush the Younger, and Trump, all held back. The current president and brass oppose greater conflict too.

China will argue that the sectarian conflict of the last forty years serves only to keep the region weak and the US strong. The argument is already widely believed in Gulf publics and parts of the state may mouth it as well. It could become justification for easing hostilities and accepting Beijing’s ascendance. 

The US as guarantor 

With war unlikely, and adamantly opposed by China, it’s better for both sides to cooperate with a power that can balance interests and keep a lid on things. The US is presently too close to Saudi Arabia and Israel to act as a neutral guarantor of regional stability and prosperity. Furthermore, the US is in decline. It’s beset by internal strife and budget woes. A new generation of voters is coming. The attraction of globalism began amid WW2, declined during Vietnam, and enjoyed only a brief resurgence following the First Gulf War. 

After two decades of failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, globalism holds little attraction with most of the youth cohort. They will be reorienting American priorities for decades. 

China’s actions in other parts of the world, and those of chief ally Russia, are making East Asia and Western Europe more important in Washington’s geopolitical calculus. Ships and planes need to be reallocated to hot spots.

The US will press for democracy and human rights. Washington’s record on promoting those values is of course checkered. Beijing’s record is perfectly consistent. It supports authoritarian rule at home, with key allies, and in African, Asian, and Latin American states in its co-prosperity sphere. Better to align with a power better disposed to Sunni princes and Shia mullahs.

Competition and fear

China has been busily negotiating with and investing in both sides of the sectarian conflict. It’s built petrochemical works, port facilities, and a pipeline running from Saudi Arabia’s oil region on the Gulf to a port on the Red Sea. The latter is of strategic value as it would allow Saudi crude to reach markets even if the Strait of Hormuz were closed. Iran presently has no such alternative.

China has been working with Iran too. It’s purchased oil contracts far out into the future, invested heavily, and inked sizable trade deals. In fact, China is probably closer to the Islamic Republic than to the kingdom. This must concern Riyadh greatly.

As a rising power China knows that Saudi Arabia and Iran want to stay on good terms with it – indeed on steadily improving terms. Exports, security, and future in the co-prosperity sphere depend on it. China, then, has considerable clout over both sides and is positioned to ease tensions, perhaps even to dictate a settlement. Demonstrating its eagerness to build consensus, as long as it weakens the US, China may allow the EU to be a junior partner in negotiations.

Both sides will benefit from a settlement, from oil and gas purchases, and amicable terms within the co-prosperity sphere. Both sides will in time be expected to support China diplomatically and in the case of the kingdom and its Sunni allies, gradually move away from reliance on the US for arms and security.

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.