Can the embattled prince play the Russia card?

Brian M Downing 

The Khashoggi affair has caused a rift between the US and Saudi Arabia. It’s also shown that the partnership is not based on shared heritage and values, but on sales of oil and weapons. President Trump cautioned that the affair might cost the US many billions in arms purchases. Mohammed bin Salman has underscored it. 

Saudi Arabia can indeed cut US arms purchases and increase Russian ones. In recent years the kingdom has maneuvered to maximize leverage on the US. Though it loathed the Soviet Union for its aversion to religion inside the country, Christianity and Islam alike, and for the Afghan war of the 80s, it has warmed to post-communist Russia. Saudi troops heft Kalashnikovs and may soon be stocked with BMP armor and an S-400 air defense system. 

Saudi allies in the GCC play the same game: respect our wishes or we shop elsewhere. The prince’s threat could become policy but it would bring problems, more for his country than the US.

Domestic politics 

Hostility toward Russia is widespread in Saudi Arabia. The Afghan war was presented as a fight against a godless power subjugating fellow Muslims and poising to grab Gulf oil. The war was long and replete with atrocities recounted over and over by revered veterans. 

The Syrian war was a reprise. Russia thwarted efforts to oust a Shia/Alawi minority government. Its aircraft relentlessly bombed Sunni fighters and civilians alike. Hospitals were targeted and chemical weapons were used, despite Russia’s pledge to get them out of the country.

If the royal family were to shift from the US to Russia, it would not sit well with many of their subjects, especially veterans of Afghanistan and Syria and their networks who’ve heard the stories of Russian atrocities. Many could heed the calls of al Qaeda and ISIL. 

The royal family cannot afford to weaken its already questionable popular base. Resentments would of course not be based on admiration for America, but hatred for Russia.

Gulf politics

There’s a conflict underway between Sunni and Shia powers, mainly Iran. Saudi leaders have skillfully maneuvered the US into the fray, irrelevant though it is to American security. The US is using dollar-power to drive foreign businesses away from Iran and ruin its economy. Washington will look the other way as the MeK and other such groups attack Iran and probably support Kurdish and Baloch separatist movements there. Only an unwise prince will put this at risk.

Russia is Iran’s most important supporter. It backs the Islamic Republic in diplomacy, with military equipment, and in Syria with airpower. A Saudi tilt toward Russia will not lead to Moscow’s abandoning Iran. More likely it will bring Russian efforts to mediate the conflict. This would be beneficial to regional tranquility and prosperity, but it’s far from what the royal family wants.

A China card? The PRC is after all a major arms producer, though chiefly of Russian copies. Beijing is eager to get more out of the Gulf arms bazaar and gain influence there. However, China, like Russia, is close to Iran. It’s contracted for Iranian oil many years out. Saudi Arabia wants an ally, not a mediator.

The Saudis might be wary of China in the long term. Unlike Russia, China’s a rising power and worrisome things come with that – upsetting the status quo, expanding global power, and demanding respect from lesser states. China already dominates East Africa and is pulling Pakistan and Sri Lanka into its sphere. Better for the Saudis to keep China dependent on their oil, not better positioned to control it. 

Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.