Brian M Downing
Mohammed bin Salman, the 33-year-old heir apparent to the Saudi throne, has been aggressively consolidating his power. Though initiating welcome reforms, he has come down hard on dissent and continued wars in Syria and Yemen. Neither conflict is going well, but the prince has skillfully maneuvered other countries to do the fighting and suffer the casualties.
Elsewhere, bin Salman is leading smaller Gulf monarchies in an alliance against Iran and Shiism. Less prominently, he’s bringing poorer countries such as Egypt and Pakistan, two countries with large, well-stocked armies, into a Saudi league. The heir apparent is mastering a powerful league of Sunni states stretching from North Africa to South Asia.
His vision of destiny has been endangered by the disappearance and probable murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi. Stemming from the prince’s arrogance and Putin’s precedents, the episode is leaving many observers and leaders to deem bin Salman not only ambitious and powerful, but dangerous if not deranged. Less a prince, more a don.
World leaders may be able to prevent bin Salman from getting away with murder and reaching the dizzying heights of absolute power and regional dominance. Pressure can be applied that will encourage figures in the royal family to block bin Salman’s ascendance and place their country on a more responsible path. Otherwise, bin Salman could rule the Kingdom and dominate the region for the next 60 years.
Internal opposition
The heir apparent has climbed over many siblings and half-siblings to reach favored status, and incurred considerable resentment along the way. There are thousands of princes and princesses who disliked the Sidari Seven, the clique of the founding king’s prodigious family, and oppose a new clique with bin Salman at the top.
Many in the royal family simply want more power and prestige for themselves. Others see their country stifled by iron-fisted autocracy and want liberal reforms to bring modernity and respectability. The heir apparent has made several missteps: embarking on failing wars in Syria and Yemen, spending lavishly on foreign countries, and sidling up to Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people. The latter move has already brought reproach from his father, the aged king.
The views of the Kingdom’s subjects are untested by western polling firms, but it’s thought that support for liberal reform is considerable. They may also respect the royal family in principle, but dislike the heir apparent and his repression, executions, foreign policy, and penchant for chateaus, yachts, and what have you. Similarly, many in the officer corps are loyal to the House of Saud but not the privileged clique that promotes favorites over professionals.
External support
Pressures can be exerted from outside the Kingdom to weaken bin Salman, rein him in, and perhaps even oust him and bring in a more respectable leader.
International isolation – Governments and organizations can reduce or halt ties to Saudi Arabia. This has already begun. Richard Branson has suspended business dealings with the Kingdom and the CEO of Uber might not attend an upcoming conference there. Other firms are weighing the benefits of continued ties versus the opposition from shareholders and publics. Growing isolation will jeopardize Saudi industrialization plans.
US operations – Saudi Arabia owns refineries in the US, and in conjunction with Royal Dutch Shell operates thousands of gasoline stations. These may be subject to public boycotts and closer legal examination. The days of American dependence on Saudi oil are over. Reduced crude from Saudi Arabia can be offset by imports from other countries and increased domestic production. The US in recent years has surpassed both Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the largest producer of oil and terminals are now exporting oil and gas.
The GCC – Diplomatic and economic pressure can be placed on smaller Sunni states such as the Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain, whose allegiance is presently with Riyadh. They must press Saudi Arabia to rethink its ways and its succession.
Qatar – The US could move closer to the small but influential Gulf country presently at odds with Saudi Arabia and much of the GCC. The US already has major bases there but joint training operations and increased arms sales would be an embarrassing rebuke to bin Salman.
Yemen – The US could propose peace talks between the warring Shia north and the Sunni south, The two regions have been fighting intermittently since the 1960s and it’s time to establish autonomy or independence. This would be a blow to Saudi prestige as it’s determined to vanquish the Shia north – strictly speaking, to use other forces to do that,
The Saudi army – The US and Britain can note the Saudi military’s dependence on them for hardware, training, maintenance, and ultimately national defense. The western powers could suspend help with the Yemen war and halt, if only temporarily, the supply of weaponry. A more responsible ruler and greater military professionalism might go hand in hand – and better serve American interests as well.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.