China watches the Great Patriotic Offensive, part two   

Brian M Downing 

China will one day have the strongest economy in the world. But without a powerful, aligned Russia, it can only be a regional military power. No Russian ally, no Chinese preeminence. Everyone’s watching Putin’s offensive which he believes will turn the tide. China is watching more keenly than most. If the offensive succeeds and brings victory, China and Russia will have taken a major step toward replacing western preeminence. If not, Russia will be burdened with a demoralized army and protracted turmoil. China can’t allow this.

The offensive  

Putin hasn’t reformed his army. Instead, he’s mobilized hundreds of thousands of recruits, indoctrinated them with Stalin-era rallying cries, and sent them into battle. Wagner Group and airborne units have shown remarkable tenacity around Bakhmut, however those parts are not the whole. Iraqi special forces are vastly superior to the rest of the national army, as were Afghan special forces and ARVN rangers. The bulk of the Russian army has thus far demonstrated no comparable resolve and may be as spiritless as they were last fall when they fled Kharkiv and Kherson. 

The view here is that Ukrainian forces are better-trained and -equipped and are fighting a defense in depth. Russia will gain some territory in coming weeks but at a high cost in casualties, cohesion, and effectiveness. Nationalist ardor will fade and discontent spread.

Assessment and reassessment in Beijing 

Chinese observers will watch intently for signs of success as the war goes into summer and perhaps fall as well. Western aid to Ukraine is unlikely to slow. Despite intermittent demurrals, it’s speeding up in quantity and sophistication. Russia cannot match it. Without a decisive breakthrough or demoralization in Ukrainian forces, Beijing will have deep concerns. 

Security bureaus are tasked with identifying worst-case scenarios and preparing for them. China’s bureaus must be working all night. The Russian army may become paralyzed and unable to serve Beijing’s interests. Senior members of army and state may be at daggers drawn. Factions may try to replace the Kremlin leadership. Popular opposition may increase as repressive capacity falters. Muslim and Asian regions may try to break away and jihadism may spread in Russia, the Near Abroad, and Xinjiang. Russia may fall into turmoil – Syria and Libya straddling the Urals. There may even be a change in government with a new disposition toward East and West.

Every planner in Beijing knows that without Russia on their side, the return of Chinese preeminence is in doubt or impossible. Every planner in Europe and East Asia knows it too.

What is to be done?

China cannot allow Russia to destroy itself on the steppes. It has to intervene in one way or another. Beijing could send more artillery, armor vehicles, and semiconductors, but they’re unlikely to change the fortunes of a poorly-built and decimated army. In any case, by fall, the damage to army and state will have been done.

China could send N Korean volunteers but that would cause egregious casualties for its only East Asian ally and invite a response in kind from Seoul.

A more likely approach, though one with considerable risk, is to press Moscow to stop the war. The duration of the halt would of course be ambiguous. Beijing could signal its power by reducing oil purchases, lessening other trade, and holding back further transfers of war materiel broadly defined. Beijing’s will could be conveyed through Russia’s industrial elite which has long ties with Chinese counterparts and its generals who have conducted joint exercises. The message will be clear: Putin is damaging the strategic interests of both states. 

Risks and rewards

China’s image as a diplomatic power will be enhanced at least somewhat. European nations will be relieved though suspicious of the halt’s duration. China’s biggest risk would be wounding Russian boastful but frail nationalism. After all, the Kremlin has seen China as a client state since the days of the Comintern and Cold War. Today the opposite is true. Being forced to accede to China’s demands could fuel resentments over economic dominance in Central Asia and the Russian Far East. Some nationalists may come to see a rising China as a greater threat than NATO.

China can ease these concerns by promising to help rebuild the Russian army and prepare it to stand up against NATO more forcefully in coming years. Officers must pass professional standards, troops must be trained in modern tactics, and equipment must be built according to demanding specifications. China will undoubtedly face resistance from the old guard but mid-level figures have seen dire need for army reform well before the debacles of the last year.

A large professional army positioned to exert power across the Eurasian land mass will greatly benefit China’s long march. NATO will be cowed and much of the world will see the light. The West and East Asia should ponder that with dread.

©2023 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.