Brian M Downing
China and Russia, though enemies for centuries, have aligned to weaken the West and create a new world order dominated from Beijing and Moscow. Putin discussed the Ukraine war with his partner not long before he crossed the border a year ago. Xi is the senior partner, though Putin might not realize it. Continuing failure in Ukraine may make it plain.
Putin promised his people a quick victory. He gave Xi the same assurance. The war has gone incredibly badly. The Russian public remains supportive, buoyed by the Kremlin’s invocation of World War Two ideology. China must be looking at Russia as a partner who boasts of virility but who cannot perform. Divorce is unthinkable. China has no alternate partner.
Beijing confronts a dilemma: increase support to Moscow or press for ceasefire lest its ally collapses. For now, Beijing is following the first path. Each path presents problems for China.
Russia’s place in China’s march
Without a powerful, aligned Russia, China can have the strongest economy in the world but it would only be a regional military power – and one facing increasingly determined enemies in East Asia. No Russian ally, no Chinese preeminence.
The Russian military, railroads, and roads allow for force projection across the Eurasian land mass. This presents extraordinary potentials for pressing against American interests and presenting opportunities for Chinese ones.
Russian oil and gas and other natural resources flow east to fuel the Chinese economy and military. Russian troops and security forces hold up governments in resource-rich Central Asia and keep a lid on Islamist insurgencies. Russia, often through the Wagner Group, also holds up governments in North Africa and the Middle East who are moving into the Chinese co-prosperity sphere.
China doesn’t want to use its own troops to hold up friendly governments and suppress jihadi threats. That’s Russia’s role. The PLA has the more important mission in East Asia.
China’s help and its risks
Beijing isn’t pleased with Moscow’s military or judgment. For now it has no choice but to continue support – and perhaps increase it. China has been buying Russian oil, albeit at discounted prices, for its strategic reserves. This holds up export revenue and a faltering currency. China is transferring military technology and US intelligence believes hardware is forthcoming.
China cannot let Russia fail. That would likely lead to protracted political turmoil and possibly to a new regime in Moscow. There could be more breakaway regions and emboldened Islamist movements from the Caucasus to China’s borders.
The escalation trap
How much help does Putin want and how much will Xi provide? Putin will want more and more until Ukraine bows and he expects Xi to deliver. Xi might think that conquest is unlikely and that at some point his aid will cause problems.
The war is casting a dark shadow on China. Putin’s ruthlessness toward Ukraine adumbrates Xi’s intentions in East Asia. Sanctions may fall on China and though they are rarely as effective as hoped, the long march to supremacy, which Xi expects to see in his lifetime, will be slowed. Western and East Asian democracies will become more cooperative. Their naval exercises underscore that China’s sea lanes to natural resources and export markets are indefensible.
Putin, eager to stave off defeat and aware of Russia’s importance to China’s long march, may try to drag China into the war, perhaps through diversion in the East. That’s unlikely now but escalation brings new realities and fears of failure.
The Great Patriotic Offensive may be Putin’s last chance to prove himself. Xi may be sufficiently canny to realize that Putin is an increasingly desperate ruler driven by wounded nationalism and unachievable dreams. If Putin’s offensive fails, say by year’s end, Beijing may have to leash the man who let loose the dogs of war.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.