Brian M Downing
Iran slipped in importance when Russia invaded Ukraine. The mullahs and generals have returned to center stage, nudged by allies and enemies but mostly on their own. They have crushed dissidents, supplied Russia with weapons, and enriched uranium near weapons-grade levels. The advancing nuclear program makes attacks on the country likely.
Dissent
Iran has had numerous periods of protest going back to the early twentieth century. Urban groups pressed for greater freedoms and sometimes regime change. Kurdish, Azeri, Baloch, and other ethnic groups resented Persian dominance and took up parts. The state managed to quash protest in every instance, except in 1979 when the Pahlavi dynasty was expelled and theocratic rule took over. The theocratic regime attained considerable legitimacy during the Iraq war of the 1980s but most Iranians have no memory of that conflict and their rulers seem out-of-date and needlessly austere.
The 2022 protests followed the death of a Kurdish woman at the rough hands of the virtue police. They spread to most cities and Kurdish and Baloch regions. Persistent and spirited as the protesters were, they did not cause division in the elite, weakness in repressive forces, or support in the representative assembly. Street demonstrations and symbolic acts meant little to the mullahs and generals who see the opposition as heretical and treasonous and deserving of the iron fist.
The view here has been that idealistic youths, repeatedly crushed and seeing no hope of change, will form violent cells and target regime officials. They may form an uneasy partnership with the MeK which has a clandestine network and considerable foreign support.
Support to Russia
Iran and Russia have been enemies since the days of the shahs and tsars. Russia occupied northern provinces during both world wars. The break with the US when the ayatollahs replaced the shahs opened the way for cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.
Nonetheless, Tehran attempted rapprochement with the US in 2003 but the Bush administration rejected it and instead advocated regime change. The JCPOA (2015) might’ve led to an easing of tensions but the US quit the agreement two years later and reimposed sanctions, even though CIA stated before Congress that Iran remained in compliance.
Iran has concluded, probably correctly, that hostility toward it is embedded in American think tanks, political groups, and Congress and that it must firmly align with Russia and China for security. In recent months Iran has supplied Shahed drones to Russia which has used them on Ukrainian targets, including, if not especially, civilian ones. IRGC cadres train Russians in occupied Crimea. Iranian missiles may be forthcoming, though Moscow is concerned it might lead to US transfer of ATACMS to Ukraine. The EU isn’t as defensive of Iran as it was a year ago.
The nuclear program
After the JCPOA breakdown, Iran returned to uranium enrichment at Fordo and Natanz and is now thought to be weeks away from a weapon. The IRGC has been working on a triggering mechanism at its Parchin base near Tehran, though like many IRGC sites it was badly damaged by an explosion.
The view here has been that Russia and China, Iran’s only strong allies, and both signatories to the JCPOA, do not want a nuclear Iran. They want no more nuclear powers in the world. A nuclear Iran would destabilize the Gulf and move the Sunni princedoms closer to the US. China gets a large portion of its energy from the region and wants to lure it from the American sphere someday. Further, neither Moscow nor Beijing trusts religious leaders, especially Islamist ones. Practical allies are preferable to zealous ones.
It’s possible these restraints no longer hold. Moscow and Beijing might now deem a nuclear Iran a blow to American authority and a step toward a new world order under their guidance. Iran may fear that Russia could disintegrate under the weight of war, leaving Iran on its own against emboldened enemies. Nuclear weapons are insurance. Russia and China could intervene at the eleventh hour to convince Iran to step back. This would bolster China’s standing in world affairs, though Russia’s is irreparably low.
Attacking Iran has long had well-positioned advocates in the US. They were held back by figures who saw US military assets stretched thin and remained unconvinced by dire assessments of Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran’s evasion of IAEA oversight and proximity to weapons-grade uranium are no longer in doubt. US assets are more abundant now and a new generation of fighters and countermeasures are at the ready. Without intervention from Beijing or a walk back in Tehran, the US and Israel will almost assuredly strike Iranian targets related to the nuclear program and drone production as well.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.