Brian M Downing
Israel’s relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia have changed markedly over the years. Moscow sent arms to Haganah as it fought the British in the early days of the Cold War. After that, however, Moscow backed Arab states. More recently Israel and Russia have built good ties.
These changes demonstrate the transience of partnerships. Israeli foreign policy thinkers should bear that in mind, even if their prime minister doesn’t. Netanyahu may look upon successes with Russia and key Arab states as tremendous feats that solidify his claim to greatness and his country’s security. But things change in world affairs – often suddenly and unexpectedly.
Putin might know the possibility of sudden change better than Netanyahu does. As the Russian president courts Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and looks at Israeli overreaches, he may be betting on it.
The past
The Soviet Union sought to strengthen its power in the Middle East and weaken the US’s by supporting many Arab states, usually secular and nominally socialist ones such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and Libya. The US, Britain, and France were closer to the monarchies, especially oil-producing ones such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Israel was in a tenuous position – opposed by almost all Arab states but backed by the West and Iran.
The Soviet Union supported its clients with weapons, training missions, advisory teams, and money. Eager for greater prestige in the region, the Soviet Union urged confrontation with Israel. The 1967 effort led to closing Israel’s access to Red Sea and then to IDF’s preemptive strike. Six days later, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies had been routed and Israel took control of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank.
Desperate to regain prestige, the defeated states, including the USSR, embraced the Palestinian cause, including its terrorist groups, and plotted revenge. In 1973 Egyptian and Syrian troops launched an unexpected attack. Soviet air defenses and antitank missiles inflicted startling casualties but the IDF, with US help, turned the tide and Arab armies once again lost.
Egypt moved out of the Soviet sphere and inked a peace agreement with Israel. Moscow continued to support Syria, Libya, and Iraq. However, without the Egyptian military, the largest and most competent of the Arab armies, another ground war with Israel was unthinkable. The Soviets and their allies continued to back the Palestinian movement.
The present
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it was desperate to restore its economy and power prestige. If took extraordinary steps of working with Israel, which saw important benefits.
Israel would not seem a likely trade or strategic partner as Russia was a bastion of antisemitism and stalwart backer of Arab enemies. But Russia enjoys a measure of support in Israel. Many Israelis emigrated from Russia and retain warm feelings toward their former homeland. All Israelis know the Red Army broke the Third Reich’s back and liberated Auschwitz and Treblinka.
Israel saw opportunity. Iran was once the source of the country’s oil but ties were deteriorating. Iraq was no longer a common danger after the US destroyed its army in 1991 and Iran was strengthening Hisbollah in Lebanon. Israel turned to Russian oil and in return exported technology – an Achilles heel to the old Soviet Union which was made clear when Israel shot down 85 Syrian MiGs in 1982 and lost only one fighter – and that to ground fire.
Israel sells technology, most notably military gear, and has expanded business ties with Russian firms. When oil and gas fields were discovered in the Mediterranean, Russian outfits got the development contracts, even though American firms had more expertise. An Israeli pipeline running from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea will send Russian oil to new markets.
The economic benefits to Israel are small compared to the security ones. Traditional enemies – Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya – have long relied greatly on Moscow’s support. They could never have launched a war without Soviet hardware and expertise, not in ’67 or ’73. No Russian help, no war. Israel is far more secure.
Netanyahu’s fixation on Iran and hard hand on the West Bank and Gaza is blinding him to potential geopolitical shifts. Israel may not be as important to Russia as the PM thinks. Putin could turn against Israel as a way to increase Russian power, weaken the US’s, and bring much of the Levant and Gulf into his sphere
© 2021Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.