Netanyahu drives a wedge between Moscow and Tehran

Brian M Downing 

Critical events related to Middle Eastern conflicts took place last week. Iran apparently fired missiles into the Golan Heights and Israel struck back on numerous Iranian positions in Syria. The US announced it’s leaving the JCPOA and new sanctions on the Islamic Republic are pending. Iran responded with rhetoric and demonstrations. 

The most intriguing event was a Moscow parley between Netanyahu and Putin. Curiously, it took place almost simultaneously with the Israeli strikes in Syria. Later announcements in Moscow and Golan, despite portentous interconnection, received little attention. They indicated that Netanyahu has done some skillful maneuvering that might become one of the greatest diplomatic achievements of our day. The auguries offer some hope for Syria, but considerable dismay for Iran.

Syrian defenses, Iranian vulnerabilities 

Shortly after the Netanyahu-Putin meeting ended, and not long after the smoke cleared over IRGC positions, the Kremlin announced it would not upgrade Syrian air defenses. The spokesman went on to say, evidently without irony, that Syria didn’t need an upgrade. He omitted mentioning the hundred or so airstrikes Israel has conducted over the years, losing only one fighter. 

The message: Israel can continue punishing Iran at will. The message has long been hinted at, as Israeli strikes over the years have met no Russian interference and only passing criticism. Now it’s unmistakable.

Shortly thereafter, Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, a Russian emigré, stated from positions on the Golan Heights that Assad should expel Iranian forces. A year ago, the statement would have been criticized and rejected in Moscow and Damascus. Both capitals are quiet. Moscow is probably now encouraging Tehran to see the advantages in leaving Syria. Otherwise, Iranian forces will suffer high casualties on a regular basis – with Moscow’s acquiescence.

Iran’s position in Syria will likely come to an end in coming months, either through withdrawal or attrition.

The Russian angle

Russia has established excellent trade relations with Israel. The US and EU have imposed sanctions on Russia over its actions in the Crimea and Ukraine, but Russian-Israeli trade increased 25% last year.

Israel sells military technology, including drones, and in return Russia sends oil to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean. Some is for domestic use, the rest is sent on to Asia by way of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba to the south. The eastern Mediterranean is becoming an appreciable source of natural gas and Israel has strategically awarded operating contracts to Russian firms.

Looking ahead, Netanyahu can use his influence with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to increase trade with Russia, especially in the lucrative arms market. Getting the US to reduce sanctions on Russia will prove more challenging but Congress may be amenable to Netanyahu’s counsel. The White House already is.

A Syrian settlement?

Iran’s departure from Syria could allow for an agreement by Israel, the US, and Russia that would reduce fighting and recognize realities.

Western Syria will be mainly Shia-Alawi with Damascus its capital and the present regime in power. Russian bases in Tartus and Latakia will protect it.

Northeastern and eastern Syria will be Sunni-Kurdish statelets under US and British protection. Lines of communication between Damascus and Tehran will be severed or left as an issue for later discussion.

Turkey will be encouraged to withdraw from the protectorate it’s established in northwestern Syria, though this is unlikely to occur.

The region east of the Golan Heights will be a demilitarized autonomous region administered by a Druze council and defended by the IDF.

All Syrian regions will continue to fight ISIL and al Qaeda redoubts.

The US and the Sunni Gulf states will provide reconstruction aid to all regions. Though it will favor the Sunni-Kurdish statelet, largesse toward Damascus would reduce remaining ties to Tehran.

Implications for Iran

The departure of Iranian troops from Syria will be presented to Syrian and Iranian publics as reward for their valor and sacrifice – “mission accomplished” in Arabic and Farsi. But it will clearly be a stinging defeat, all the more so if lines of communication to Syria and Lebanon are severed. Hisbollah, the formidable Shia movement that forced the IDF to quit Lebanon, will be gravely weakened and Iran will have no substantive military allies anywhere.

Iran will feel betrayed by Russia, its closest ally, acting in concert with its fiercest enemy. Hardliners will be on the back foot and public support, even among the pious and militant, will be imperiled. The generals may want to restart their nuclear program as a symbol of independent determination and national unity.

Putin will try to assuage hard feelings, if only to preserve his image as a reliable ally. He could press for a guarantee of lines of communication between Tehran and Damascus, but Israel is unlikely to go for it. 

He might have more success in convincing Jerusalem and Washington to accept their achievement in Syria and ease up on Iranian sanctions, providing of course the nuclear program remains in check. Putin may also convince the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to refrain from supporting bombings and insurgencies inside Iran. The three powers may be amenable but each has a potent Tehran delenda est camp which wants the Islamic Republic put on the path of disintegration.

Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.