Brian M Downing
Sectarian conflict, chiefly between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has been underway for decades. Based at least as much on religious hatred as national security, it reached intense levels with the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s and took hundreds of thousands of lives. Afterward, animosities lessened but picked up again during the civil war in Syria. The conflict has taken on a more aggressive and international form with Israeli and American support for the Sunni camp.
One outcome, a triumphant Saudi Arabia, has been considered previously. (“Outcome scenarios in the sectarian wars: Saudi Arabia triumphant,” 14 May 2018) A Saudi victory would bring new problems for the region and the US. The risks and benefits of protracted stalemate will be looked at here.
Cui bono?
Someone has benefited from wars at least since Rome and Carthage fought for control of the Mediterranean. In previous centuries Britain rose in power while continental armies fought each other. After the Great War, General Smedley Butler counseled that war was a racket.
Protracted conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia will require longterm arms purchases, mainly from western countries. The US leads the world in arms sales and is well connected to Sunni states in the Gulf. The relationship blossomed with the oil hikes after the Yom Kippur War (1973) when the Nixon administration countered the ensuing balance of payments woes by convincing Gulf states, Sunni and Shia alike, that they needed well-accoutered militaries.
The sectarian wars of our day are unlikely to see the scale of fighting of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Nonetheless, small arms, anti-tank weaponry, numerous upgrades, and extended training and maintenance cadres will be needed. Western arms will flow into the Gulf, petrodollars will flow out — both in abundance.
With much of the Islamic world, especially its wealthier countries, preoccupied, Israel will reap security benefits. Indeed, with Syria and Iraq in ruins and facing internal turmoil if not disintegration, Israel is more secure than ever. Guerrilla groups abound along its borders, but they’ve been there since the time of the Mandate and will never pose the danger that the armies of Nasser and Assad the Elder once did.
Chinese diplomatic coup
Beijing may see an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. It can present the wars as the result of foreign efforts to weaken the Gulf states and reap financial and geostrategic windfalls.
Mediation from a state heretofore uninvolved in decades of meddling can restore stability to the region. Naturally, Beijing, a power that imports ample amounts of Gulf oil from both sides, would be best positioned to offer its good offices. China’s more belligerent stances along its periphery, where islands are created and militarized, will be softened by its adroit diplomacy. China will have taken a leap forward in its goal to become the center of the world again. Perhaps the grateful parties will reward China with arms purchases.
Mutual destruction
About 40% of the population of both Iran and Saudi Arabia is under 25. Many young people face dim futures and no longer accept their leaders’ word and legitimacy as above question. Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia population. And Iran has Sunni peoples and large ethnic minorities, not all of which appreciate Persian rule.
Tensions could rise to destabilizing levels as budgets shift to long wars, all the more so if the wars require even moderate hardships and casualties. A long stalemate will accelerate youth discontent, internal sectarian strains, and ethnic restiveness – perhaps to an extent that destabilizes both Riyadh and Tehran.
Both powers could disintegrate into a handful of statelets: Iran into Kurdish, Azari, Baloch, Arab, and Persian regions; Saudi Arabia into a Shia east, a theocratic Mecca and Medina, and a miscellany of tribal regions and warlord realms.
Libya, Syria, Yemen, and to an undetermined extent Iraq have already broken apart, exposing the tenuous hold that rulers have over fractious and heterogeneous subjects. The war between Saudi Arabia and Iran may become a game of international chicken in which each side is confident the other will break first. But both sides could drive over the cliff.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.