Policy and failure twenty years on – part three, Iran  

Policy and failure twenty years on – part three, Iran  

Brian M Downing

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks opened a path to better US-Iran  relations. Washington could have restored comity with a powerful regional actor and renewed trade with its 75 million people, many with rising incomes and western tastes. 

The Bush administration sabotaged rapprochement. Its rationale claimed to be related to 9/11 but was based on anti-Iran pressures in Washington. Iran is now an implacable foe, determined to work with Russia and China to weaken the US. Their effort is well underway.

Iran after 9/11

Tehran expressed sympathy after the attacks and offered assistance. It had Tajik and Hazara allies who were fighting the Taliban and when US special forces linked up with the Northern Alliance they found IRGC counterparts who’d been there for years. The Iranians shared intelligence, helped with ground operations, and arranged to help downed US pilots. There was a promising basis for change.

Another chance came after the US invaded Iraq two years later. Tehran offered to hand over al Qaeda figures who’d escaped from Afghanistan, in exchange for MeK chiefs. The MeK had been used by Saddam to strike inside Iran, it was on the US terrorism list, so the request was not out of line. Iran sent a message to Sec of State Powell requesting a dialog to reset relations. Powell supported dialog. 

The White House summarily rejected the MeK swap offer and the request for dialog as well. Iran was part of the “axis of evil” and the administration had more regime change in mind. Iran’s refusal to hand over AQ personnel without the MeK exchange was perversely used as evidence of Tehran’s ties to AQ. 

Iran ordered Shia militias in Iraq to attack US and allied forces, though they needed little urging. Iraq became Hobbes-istan. After several years, Shia militias stopped attacking Western troops and the Bush administration dropped talk of regime change in Iran. A full understanding of those two events may come one day.

Treaty, no treaty 

The Obama administration took advantage of the ceasefire and negotiated the JCPOA nuclear treaty. Tehran’s rhetoric remained hostile toward the US. The mullahs and generals realized that delenda est Tehrano convictions were entrenched in Congress, think tanks, and media and that US policy could switch with an election.

Donald Trump called for abandoning the JCPOA in the 2016 presidential campaign and did just that a year after taking office. The US imposed sanctions and supported MeK assassinations and bombings inside Iran. The MeK currently has been based in Albania since withe US relocated it there in 2016. Trump opted not to pursue more aggressive policies, probably out of cautious dilettantism. 

Iran wants revenge 

Tehran is all the more convinced of entrenched anti-Iran forces in Washington and the impossibility of rapprochement. It has aligned with Russia and China for its defense and for punishing the US. It supported the Taliban from an IRGC base in southeastern Iran and enjoyed seeing a humiliating American defeat. 

Iran will now try to expel the US from Iraq. Tehran has considerable influence with Iraqi militias, which will inflict casualties, and with political groups, which will build consensus for ordering the US out – again. 

Tehran pressed for the 2008 expulsion and wants a reprise – a more lasting one, a permanent one. A decade ago Baghdad awarded oil leases to China which in turn invested in the economy. Beijing will use its influence to strengthen the push for expulsion. Sunni and Shia Iraqis are both annoyed by the continuing US presence and might readily support expulsion. 

If the order comes, the US position in eastern Syria – another poorly thought-out policy – will be difficult to sustain. The US may be ousted from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, perhaps all within a year. 

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The Iran policy, like the Iraq war, was unrelated to the 9/11 attacks. Nonetheless, dubious and false arguments were put forth in both cases. The policies were advanced by White House policy makers, mainly of the Neoconservative creed, who prevailed upon uninformed presidents, irresponsible generals, and uninterested publics. Both policies have contributed to America’s appalling failures and diminishing prestige since 2001. Allies are dismayed, enemies elated. 

© 2021 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.