Protest and repression in the Middle East today

Brian M Downing 

The Arab Spring of 2011 was so promising. Centuries of corrupt, oligarchic rule would come to an ignominious end and government would be in the hands of young, educated people. The smartphone and social media would overwhelm clubs and tear gas. A few years on, little has changed – except for the number of tombstones and ruins. 

Someone noted the French Revolution began with liberty, equality, and fraternity but swiftly gave way to infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Only in Tunisia has representative government taken hold. Elsewhere, civil wars continue, separatist movements draw lines, and Islamist bands seize territory.

Reform movements have begin recently in Sudan and Algeria. They face strong though not insurmountable opposition from domestic forces. There’s little prospect of support from the West. Saudi support for the anciens regimes is assured.

Window dressing 

Oligarchies have responded to crises by changing ministers and promising reform, then hoping their publics will leave the streets and the regime will remain in power. It worked reasonably well in Yemen as Ali Saleh promised change but simultaneously negotiated for Saudi backing to stave off change. Assad tried the same pro forma changes in Syria but of course failed badly.

The Algerian rulers are facing its strongest challenge since the Islamist insurgency of the 90s. The leader, the aged Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has acceded to popular demands not to run again for president. The regime hopes this will quell the protests but at present they are continuing. 

Repressive capacity

The Arab Spring’s most significant lesson is that leaders who retained their military’s loyalty stayed in power. Those that didn’t had to flee – or tried to.

Calls for protests in Saudi Arabia in 2011 were met with damning fatwas and threats of severe repression. Security forces deployed throughout major cities and young people would not test their resolve. 

The Egyptian army played the protests cleverly if cynically. They seemed to side with demonstrators and looked on as Mubarak stood down. They allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to assume power after its candidates won parliamentary elections. However, they worked hand in glove with Saudi Arabia to cause economic troubles and popular discontent, then took power in a bloody coup.

Foreign help in repression 

Foreign powers have played important roles in quashing unrest. Saudi Arabia is determined to prevent democracy in the region and sees any protest as a spark that could ignite a new regional conflagration. As noted, Riyadh helped bring the Egyptian army to power. Saudi security forces crossed over a causeway and crushed the opposition movement in Bahrain. Its forces were bolstered by hundreds of veterans of Pakistan’s army.

Assad would not have held on in Syria except for timely introduction of Hisbollah, IRGC, and Shia mercenary units. And of course Russian airpower stepped in to crush rebel forces. More recently Russian private contractors have supported authoritarian regimes in Sudan and the Central African Republic. They have also been dispatched to keep Maduro in Venezuela. 

Foreign help for reform

Forces of reform cannot rely on significant foreign help. The Obama administration wanted to see reform in the Middle East but stood by as the Egyptian army killed almost a thousand demonstrators. Its halting efforts to shape events in Syria were more in the name of opposing ISIL than advancing democracy. The present administration will not stand in the way of Saudi efforts to hold up authoritarian rulers.  

EU intervention is unlikely too. Britain and France favor reform but do not want to risk their defense contracts with the Saudi defenders of oligarchy.  As noted here many times, the Saudis do not buy weapons to build a powerful army. They do so to gain influence in powerful countries.

European countries are weary of involvement in the Middle East. Britain and France are involved in Syria and a host of former colonies. Involvement brings only death and devastation which in turn calls for deeper involvement. It also brings refugees.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.