Brian M Downing
The American phase of Afghanistan’s wars began after al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. Since then, however, the group’s significance declined. The war became a Taliban-based insurgency, al Qaeda lost many leaders and fighters, and ISIL seized territory while al Qaeda was in hiding.
Today, after 17 years of fighting and 2,400 American deaths, al Qaeda has become an important issue in US-Taliban talks in Qatar. The Taliban are unwilling to agree to expel al Qaeda from eastern Afghanistan.
The US will not agree to this. The group is regaining strength under Osama bin Laden’s son. Accepting its presence would be admission that our long, costly war has been for nothing. Governments don’t like to admit failure, especially when elections loom. What’s behind the Taliban position?
Bargaining
The US response to the al Qaeda issue will let the Taliban gauge Washington’s eagerness to quit Afghanistan and know their bargaining strength. President Trump has spoken of halving troop levels in Afghanistan and questioned the usefulness of other foreign involvements too. Taliban negotiators have been listening intently.
The presence of al Qaeda may be a bargaining chip. The Taliban will break with al Qaeda and perhaps even aid in its expulsion, providing the US makes important concessions – control over disputed districts, greater autonomy from Kabul, and more economic aid.
Loyalty
The Taliban have benefited from al Qaeda ever since the Haqqanis brought the two groups together during the civil war of the 90s. Since then, Taliban and al Qaeda forces have fought together, most notably against the Northern Alliance.
The Taliban may also benefit from al Qaeda’s connections. AQ is perhaps the most notable of the militant groups in eastern Afghanistan – stalwart fighters all. Beyond the country, AQ has ties to wealthy donors in Pakistan and the Gulf states. Their continued assistance will be important after a settlement comes. Reconstruction will be long and expensive.
Internationalism
As would be expected in a Pashtun tribal movement, the Taliban have been relatively uninterested in the outside world, except of course when parts of it invade their districts and valleys. However, there’s always been an internationalist wing. In the 90s, when parts of the Taliban shura called for expelling al Qaeda to avoid foreign troubles, internationalists countered that the Taliban regime required outside help, lest Russia or other powers invade again someday.
Hosting al Qaeda of course brought disaster. The US linked up with the Northern Alliance and sent the Taliban packing for the mountains and Pakistan. This, however, did not discredit the internationalists. Indeed, the long war, which was supported from abroad, may have strengthened them.
Practicality
Osama bin Laden is dead but AQ’s leadership is hidden in Pakistan and its fighters are ensconced along the Durand Line. The Taliban might not be able to drive them out even if they wanted to. The US tried for 17 years without great success.
Eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani frontier is home to a handful of international jihadi groups beside al Qaeda. Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan, Uighur bands, and others are all encamped there as well. They train together, exchange tactical and bomb-making skills, and conduct joint patrols. They would cooperate in the defense of their mountainous redoubt.
The Islamist bands would probably be assisted by local tribes. They are not parts of the two main tribal groupings – the Ghilzai and Durrani confederations – and are even more resistant to outsiders than their brethren. Fighting from defensive positions on territory they know well, the Islamist bands and tribal levies would inflict serious casualties on any outside force.
Pakistan
The supportive relationship between Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI) and the Taliban is clear. The same can be said of ISI and the Islamist bands of eastern Afghanistan. The discovery of Osama bin Laden’s compound only a stone’s throw from an army base made plain what was long suspected.
The generals pay al Qaeda to train Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad guerrillas who attack Indian targets. The 2008 Mumbai attack was one, last month’s ambush in Indian-administered Kashmir another.
The generals might not want the Taliban to abandon al Qaeda et al. Southern and eastern Afghanistan figure, if oddly, in Pakistan’s war plans. In the event of an overwhelming Indian invasion, Afghanistan would be a formidable redoubt where the army could reconstitute itself and carry on the war.
The generals might also worry that driving al Qaeda and its allies out of eastern Afghanistan would drive them into Pakistan’s restive tribal area – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province). This would present dual problems. The generals could no longer deny responsibility for al Qaeda et al as the groups would be undeniably on Pakistani territory. More problematic, however, is the risk of further radicalization of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and perhaps even a push for independence from Islamabad.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.