Brian M Downing
SDF troops supported by American, British, and French advisors have greatly reduced ISIL territory in Syria. Only a small portion of land near Deir Azour remains. ISIL’s positions in Iraq are negligible too. Most ISIL troops fight to the end, though recently, near Deir Azour, several dozen surrendered. How many have been able to exfiltrate is of course unknown. Ongoing fighting is fierce – an ominous signal of ISIL fighters’ discipline and cohesion.
The position here is that ISIL can thrive in Central Asia – the vast, poorly governed area stretching from the Caspian Sea to western China. ISIL set up an affiliate in Afghanistan, IS-Khorasan, and charged it with coalescing the numerous Islamist groups there and establishing an empire to the north. IS-K has succeeded only in forming a few bands in Afghanistan, but the ‘Stans remain fertile ground.
But what of ISIL’s future in Syria, Iraq, and adjoining countries? Will it be able to go from caliphate to underground network? Several reasons suggest it will.
Local populations
The population of Syria is about 74% Sunni and 13% Shia/Alawi. The minority Shia/Alawi people dominate army, state, and economy. The Arab Spring began as a reform movement comprising both sects but degenerated into a vicious sectarian war – a transition helped along by government massacres of Sunnis. The long war saw continued massacres, by all sides, and the government’s use of airstrikes and chemical weapons on civilians. Civilian casualties often came from deliberate targeting, not from collateral damage.
The US invasion of Iraq (2003) ended the Sunni minority’s dominance and installed a long-suffering Shia majority. The spirit of reconciliation hasn’t announced itself. Shia governments have been oppressive toward their old masters, understandably so but with bleak implications for the future.
Sunni populations in both Syria and Iraq despise their governments and have fought long, bitter, and unsuccessful insurgencies against them. The prospects of better relations are nonexistent in Syria and limited in Iraq, despite assurances from Baghdad. Neither Sunni populations will embrace ISIL in numbers but lingering hatreds toward Damascus and Baghdad will provide some support for ISIL guerrillas and bombers and a steady source of recruits.
Weak governments
Shia governments are corrupt and unorganized and unable to adequately administer Sunni areas, even if they wanted to. Syria is in ruins, the government geared toward death and intimidation. Reconstruction efforts will be slow and more favorable to regime loyalists than suspected rebels and terrorists.
Iraq’s Sunnis are in the center and Anbar province in the west – the latter being a desolate region that was home to determined resistance to the US occupation. Many Sunnis initially welcomed ISIL after its 2014 blitzkrieg but of course soon became appalled by its brutality. Though Baghdad controls border crossings and military outposts, its grip on the west is limited. Efforts to strengthen it will worsen matters.
Support networks
ISIL could forge or expand working relations with religious and criminal groups. Salafi networks, comprising believers in Wahhabism and like-minded austere, anti-western Islamism, are prevalent throughout the region. Some adherents are veterans of the Afghan war of the 80s and more recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria.
Salafism has gained a larger following in recent decades – in part due to Saudi proselytization efforts, in part due to war. Many Iraqi soldiers and officers turned to soul-searching after the humiliating defeat of 1991 and found an answer in deeper religious commitment. Some joined al Qaeda and ISIL. More recently, many in the general public, on seeing their country torn apart by insurgency and civil war, turned to deeper faith. ISIL’s apocalyptic vision and Salafism are not identical but there’s considerable overlap. Frightening times blur the lines.
Smuggling and insurgency go hand in hand. Insurgents live outside the law and require clandestine ways of getting arms and ammunition. Sunni tribes of western Iraq, members of the large and powerful Dulayim confederation, have been skilled smugglers since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Its sheikhs are veritable dons presiding over numerous criminal endeavors.
The Dulayim were central to the Sunni resistance to the US occupation and later to the Sunni Awakening which crushed al Qaeda in Iraq, for a while. The confederation despises Shia rule but is nonetheless unlikely to make common cause with ISIL, which after all is the successor to al Qaeda in Iraq, the group that’s been assassinating Dulayim leaders since the Awakening. Parts of the tribal group, however, may provide ISIL with supplies – for a fee of course. The smugglers know the ropes and need the money.
Saudi Arabia
The view here has been that Saudi Arabia aided the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, including the al Qaeda affiliate, following the 2003 invasion. Such is Riyadh’s hostility toward Shiism and Iran. Drawing from Saudi intelligence sources, a recent study of ISIL operations in Afghanistan reports that Saudi Arabia funded ISIL and its precursors until the group’s 2014 offensive unnerved the princes of Riyadh. Nonetheless, the Saudis today support IS-Khorasan in the hope its lethal talents can be directed against Iran.
Muhammad bin Salman, the kingdom’s aggressive and unprincipled ruler, might make the same play for ISIL’s remnants in Syria and Iraq. Drop the impractical millenarian vision and join our anti-Shia campaign. The funds are at the ready.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.