Brian M Downing
This morning ethnic Russian soldiers of the Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL), backed by Kyiv, crossed into Russia’s Belgorod region, north of central Ukraine. The force, perhaps two battalions of ethnic Russians, claim to be establishing a buffer area just south of Belgorod to push Russian artillery back. This means it’s an effort to hold ground, not a raid. The attack was coordinated with sabotage attacks in and around Belgorod city.
A battle is coming inside Russia. It will force Moscow to weaken areas inside Ukraine and engage in what will likely be a bloody contest. It may prepare the way for the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive.
Diversion
The FRL attack will divert Russian troops and resources away from operations inside Ukraine. The size of the force isn’t large, but the audacity of taking Russian territory and the institutional paranoia of Russian security will lead to speculation and overreaction.
Will Ukrainian units armed with new western tanks come to the aid of the FRL? Will a similar Belarussian force cross into their home country to destabilize one of Putin’s few allies? Is NATO planning incursions along Russia’s border anywhere from Finland to Romania? Only the second scenario seems plausible but Russian bureaus will take all three seriously.
Russia must pull troops from somewhere, probably experienced ones. The best troops are engaged around Bakhmut. Withdrawing them would risk losing Russia’s only gains of the last year, meager though they are. Owing to the land bridge’s strategic value, Russia will be loath to take troops from there. Besides, they’re far away and action is needed immediately. This leaves the units stretched across the vast perimeter and new conscripts. They have not distinguished themselves in battle and withdrawal presents opportunities for Ukraine.
Home front
Kyiv and the FRL hope to rally opponents of the Russian state. Some Russians may travel to southern Belgorod and join the fight. Others may take part in sabotage against military and industrial targets, perhaps alongside Ukrainian social forces. However, the exodus of hundreds of thousands young middle-class men eager to avoid military service will limit the prospects of substantially increased domestic opposition.
The attack is a serious embarrassment to Russia, all the more so the longer it goes on. But it’s unlikely to badly weaken support for the war. It may well have the opposite effect. Moscow will present the attack as part of a NATO strategy to bring Russia down and call upon the nation to double their efforts. Repression at home – heavy-handed and poorly directed – may double as well.
The battle
Moscow cannot allow the FRL to hold territory. Putin takes the attack as an insult that must be avenged. Russia will attack soon to prevent a rallying point and base of operations, discourage sympathetic rebellions in Belarus and the Muslim Caucasus, and make examples of the invaders. The FRL will dig into defensive positions and coordinate with Ukraine for drone and artillery support and supplies.
Russia will likely respond with heavy artillery bombardments for several days, followed by ground attacks. Ukraine will use counter-battery fire, though equipment such as HIMARS cannot presently be used outside Ukraine. FRL forces will continue to harass Russian rear areas.
The correlation of forces does not favor the FRL. Ukrainian units are unlikely to cross the border, save for the special forces already at work. The FRL attack aims mainly at drawing Russian troops out of Ukraine, wearing them down, and preparing to deliver a heavy blow elsewhere. Putin will have to keep a larger number of troops near Belgorod permanently.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.