Brian M Downing
The long-awaited Ukrainian offensive may have begun near Bakhmut. It comes after weeks of attacks on Russian depots in the east and inside Russia itself. Expectations vary. Kyiv cautions that the offensive might not be as formidable as thought. Many outside analysts think it will be highly successful, so much so that Ukraine must guard against pushing Moscow toward a chemical or nuclear response.
The view here is that Kyiv will be highly successful but the main blow will aim toward the land bridge and approaches to Crimea. Feints and probes were likely elsewhere. Bakhmut may be the first.
Why the attack around Bakhmut? What’s the significance?
The forces
The Russian army, from the war’s outset, showed serious deficiencies in training, leadership, supply, equipment, and cohesion. The only significant change has been in the inculcation of a motherland-imperiled spirit drawn from WW2 memories, especially among Wagner and airborne units. It’s no substitute for deficiencies.
Wagner and airborne forces have shown remarkable determination in assaults on Bakhmut since last August. Gains have been slight, casualties high. US estimates, usually cautious, indicate 20,000 Russian dead around Bakhmut since January. That’s roughy 27 BTGs annihilated. Many more of the Group’s valkyries were badly wounded.
Effectiveness has been further reduced by hostility between Wagner Group and regulars. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s leader, asserts his troops are not being as well supplied as others and they are being deliberately ordered into pointless attacks. He has threatened to pull them out of Bakhmut and leave it to Chechen troops, who are far better at self-promotion than fighting. There’s disquiet on the front.
The army resents the Wagner Group for its institutional independence and relative success in battle. Skirmishes have taken place and could deepen as difficulties and recriminations come. This parallels mistrust between the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, the Iranian army and Revolutionary Guards, and more recently between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, who are now battling for control of Khartoum. Hostilities are so deep around Bakhmut that if the Wagner forces weren’t so murderous, Kyiv might try to get them to switch sides.
A depleted, divided enemy makes Bakhmut an inviting target. Ukrainian and Russian sources report Ukrainian advances north of the town. The latter sources refer to taking “more defensible positions,” Wagner leaders say Russian army troops are fleeing.
Ukrainian successes do not stem from massing large quantities of troops and supplies. They stem from weaknesses in the army in front of them. Accordingly, the view here stands that the main blow will be elsewhere. Moscow may have the same assessment.
The response
Russian positions around Bakhmut and in the entire east are in jeopardy. A sizable Ukrainian breakthrough is possible, as is the collapse of several Russian BTGs. It may be necessary to bring in reinforcements. However, troops in other parts of the long front, though spared the devastating losses of Wagner and airborne units, aren’t in good condition. They have been worn down by drones, snipers, artillery, and harsh weather while hunkered down in static positions.
Russia is unlikely to pull troops from the land bridge. Better to give up territory in the east than to weaken positions in the south. Losing ground there endangers the Crimea which has a mythic meaning in Russian history from the Tatar wars to the Nazi invasion and geopolitical importance for operations in the Middle East and North Africa.
Morale
Substantial losses of territory are certain. The same holds for morale. After the debacles of last year, the army has been buoyed not by reform or victory, but by WW2 ideology. Events on the battlefield this year may weaken that spirit.
Loss of hard-won territory around Bakhmut may greatly weaken the morale of Wagner and airborne troops – the best Moscow can field. They have suffered staggering casualties and must now retreat to previous positions across gnarled land and makeshift graveyards. Regular units are unlikely to be motivated after another failure alongside Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and the Moskva. Word of the casualties at Bakhmut has reached them.
Putin’s speeches and ceremonies have attached great prestige to gains around Bakhmut. That will be gone soon. His troops along the vast perimeter must now await the hammer blows of the main Ukrainian offensive. Putin will have to find more nationalistic material.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.