The Iran-Saudi Arabia dialog – and China 

Brian M Downing

Saudi Arabia and Iran have compelling domestic incentives to pursue negotiations and ease tensions. Dialog is almost certainly being encouraged by China. It may even have helped initiate it. It has considerable influence on both sides of the Gulf and ambition to replace the United States as guarantor of the region’s security. 

Beijing’s arguments  

American oil production has soared in the last twenty years. The US no longer buys a great deal of hydrocarbons from the Gulf. Nor does Europe, though Asian allies do. Most countries are shifting to renewables and getting greater efficiency from fossil fuels. 

China’s demand for Gulf hydrocarbons is growing and will continue for decades to come. Its influence in Riyadh and Tehran is considerable and on the rise. Both capitals are bound to tilt more and more to the East.

Beijing will note that the US is in political and military decline. Furthermore, Washington has long been overly reliant on military force and has used it injudiciously and unsuccessfully, especially in the last twenty years. It has threatened Iran but never attacked, despite encouragement from regional allies. Washington’s one-sidedness makes it a threat to peace. It’s time for new management.

How important will the US economy be in coming years? How coherent will the country be? How able will it be to act decisively in the world? Better for the Gulf rivals to reduce ties with Washington and align with the rising order directed from Beijing. China offers immense investments, sophisticated technology, and access to a domestic market of over a billion people with rising incomes. 

China guarantor 

Enmity between Saudi Arabia and Iran is deep. Saudis see “Persians” as loathsome apostates and Iranians know well that Riyadh backed Iraq in the 1980s war that killed half a million Iranians. A deal negotiated today may fall apart tomorrow. An accidental skirmish, an ambitious new ruler, or internal turmoil could blow it. 

An external power would be helpful in closing a negotiated deal and also in maintaining it. The US is too close to Saudi Arabia and too hostile to Iran to do that. The EU is uninterested in a long-term commitment in a faraway region with little importance. China has interests and ambitions there.

If one side were to threaten the peace, Beijing could reduce oil purchases from it, restrict its exports to China, buy more from its rival, and sell the rival more lethal weaponry as well. Some day the PLA navy may ply the Gulf.

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Encouraging and guaranteeing a settlement would greatly advance Beijing’s Long March. It would better secure energy supplies for years to come. Arms sales could go up significantly – at the expense of Boeing, General Dynamics, and the entire American economy. It would also be a step toward pushing the US out of its slew of bases in the Gulf. There could be no clearer signal of China’s ascendance than the sight of its flag going up in Bahrain, the Emirates, and the kingdom.

© 2021Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.