Brian M Downing
Attention has long focused on the south where 20,000 Russian troops are isolated west of the Dnipro. A Ukrainian offensive there seemed imminent.That may still come, but a few days ago the Ukrainians drove east from the northern city of Kharkiv.
The results have been astonishing. About 1,000 square miles have been liberated and the Russians are fleeing in disarray. Hundreds of armored vehicles have been abandoned and thousands of troops are trapped around Izyum. The only way out is under Ukrainian artillery control. A repeat of the German 7th Army’s destruction in the Falaise pocket may be at hand.
How did this happen?
Poor unit cohesion and heavy losses
The view here, since war’s outset, has been that the Russian army is deeply flawed by poor cohesion. Units lack homogeneity and camaraderie to hold up in combat, a harsh institutional culture limits trust, and the absence of NCOs causes a gap between officers and soldiers. Training is poor; effectiveness is expected to follow from aggressive nationalism and opportunities for pillage.
Over the summer a measure of cohesion emerged under the tutelage of hardship, necessity, and success in the Donbas. However, the offensive brought heavy casualties, especially in better units, and territorial gains were paltry. Combatants looked back on 25 kms of advances and looked around at depleted ranks.
Comrades, many of them were dead or wounded, replaced by unknown, inexperienced, and untrustworthy fresh faces. The rapport and respect that officers established diminished. Troops are no longer moving forward, taking ground, giving as much as they take. They’re stalled, dispirited, and attritted daily. Many are now fleeing encirclement, capture, or annihilation.
Logistics
The Russian army showed its logistical incompetence early on. Fuel and food didn’t reach frontline troops. Convoys stalled on the roads to Kyiv, even though it was less than a hundred miles from Russia. Supplies were somewhat less problematic in the Donbas owing to the industrial region’s system of roads and railroads.
In recent weeks Russian logistics have been hit hard by Ukrainian HIMARS. Targeted by drones, satellites, and civilians with GPS apps on their phones, depot after depot has been hit. Skies have lit up for miles around as fuel and ammunition blow up.
Partisan operations have also hurt. In the early years of the Cold War, US Green Berets trained Europeans to wage guerrilla warfare in the event Soviet and WTO forces overran their countries. Green Berets have done the same in Ukraine since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and the esst. Quick learners, Ukrainian partisans have been diligently blowing bridges along supply routes.
Ukrainian deceptions
During the Donbas offensive, Russian artillery pounded Ukrainian positions. This was a return to a Russian way of war which relies on heavy artillery to open the way for ground troops. Ukrainian casualties were said to be staggering – 100 KIAs a day and twice that during exceptionally heavy fighting.
The figures may well be accurate. However, Ukrainian generals read Sun Tzu. They may have overstated casualties to lead Russian counterparts to believe its enemy had suffered egregious casualties and no longer posed an offensive threat, especially in the north and east.
For weeks, Ukraine has been signaling a counterattack in the south. The Dnipro bridges were targeted, isolating Russian troops to the west. Guerrilla operations thrived in Kherson and Melitopol and along the land bridge. Missiles struck Crimean bases. And President Zelensky vowed to retake the peninsula which is so vital to Russian prestige and positions in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
Russia sent tens of thousands of reinforcements to the south. Convoy after convoy rolled across the Kerch Strait Bridge, which Ukraine, inexplicably at the time, didn’t try to bring down. The north and east were left vulnerable. Bringing troops back from the south will take time and would leave the south weakened. Ukraine might not be so gracious as to allow the Kerch Strait Bridge to remain intact.
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A harsh defeat east of Kharkiv has already happened and a similar one looms west of the Dnipro. Russia may soon see tens of thousands of troops killed, wounded, or captured in each locale. The army would be incapable of offensive operations for a year at least and would have to struggle to hold on. Morale and discipline would plummet. Defeat, with all its implications for top generals and Putin himself, would lour over the Kremlin.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.