Brian M Downing
China and Russia were enemies for centuries as the tsars expanded from the Urals to the Pacific and took Chinese territory along the way. Even when both states were overtly communist, there were tensions and even border skirmishes over territory. The bloodiest one, in 1969, led to Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China – a devastating geopolitical blow to the Soviet Union.
Alignments change. China and Russia have joined forces to weaken American global power and place themselves atop a new world order. The US and the West were in decline. China’s long march to restored preeminence was well underway. The plan looked good.
Putin’s Ukraine war has brought serious problems, not only for his country but also for China’s trust. He’s jeopardized the long march or at least delayed it for years. Xi must have been weighing matters closely when he met with Putin last week. He may have shown disappointment or even ire. The Kremlin leader may not be able to play the role written for him.
Russia’s role
China relies on Russia for several aspect of the long march:
Russia supplies energy and raw materials. Pipelines bring oil and gas to the east. Metals and lumber go there by road and rail.
Russia provides stability in Central Asia where Chinese investments are high, governments weak, and jihadism strengthening.
Russian troops and mercenaries prop up friendly, commodity-producing and geopolitical-significant governments in Africa (Sudan, CAR, eastern Libya, Chad) and South America (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba), integrating them into the Chinese sphere.
Russia and China want to expel the US from the Persian Gulf, another vital energy source for Beijing. China wants to replace the US as chief arms supplier and guarantor of oil transits. As long as American flags fly over the Gulf, Chinese energy sources remain insecure.
China envisioned the Russian military as a powerful counterpoise to American might all along the Eurasian land mass, the Middle East, North Africa, and northern Latin America. The counterpoise would strengthen Chinese global power and perhaps one day allow it to conquer Taiwan.
In return for performing these roles, Russia gets help returning to great power status, revenge against the US and NATO, and partnership in Beijing’s co-prosperity sphere.
The Ukraine war
China’s confidence in Russia’s effectiveness has been undermined. Since the war began, NATO has firmer resolve, greater military budgets, and two additional members in Finland and Sweden. Moscow’s resources are stretched thinner by the day and even eventual peace in Ukraine will bring no respite along western borders.
Democracies in Europe and Asia recognize common dangers in Sino-Russian expansionism and are strengthening ties. Moscow’s effort to eradicate the Ukrainian identity underscores Beijing’s hard hand on the Uighur people.
The Russian army has been exposed as ill-trained, poorly equipped, and incompetently led by both military and civilian leaders. It’s incapable of reform, at least under present management.
The army is on the verge of a humiliating defeat. It may be close to disintegration and major internal strife. A few units are already refusing orders and engaging in firefights with others, especially FSB and Rosgvardiya detachments.
Putin’s autocratic state is not as strong as it was a year ago. Oligarchs are dismayed by increasing sanctions and grim outlooks. A dozen or so have died mysteriously, bringing fear of an erratic and paranoid leader, like Stalin in the 30s and late in life. Senior officers below the coterie of political appointees know the army is in need of sweeping reform and the state isn’t up to the job.
There’s instability along Russia’s periphery. Azerbaijan and Armenia are warring again, skirmishes are breaking out between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan and others are increasingly hostile to Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions. China doesn’t want to assume the difficult and open-ended task of stabilizing Russian border areas.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.